“I Might Talk Slow but I Think Fast”:

Changing Contexts and Lessons Learned from Community-based Organizations undergoing Long-term Recovery on the Mississippi Gulf Coast

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Division at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in

Psychology

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December 2016

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Acknowledgments

This research was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant CMMI-0623991 and by the University of South Carolina Office of the Provost internal grant program. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the University of South Carolina.

Abstract

This study sought to understand the role that community-based organizations (CBOs) play in long-term recovery by examining the ways in which CBOs on the Mississippi Gulf Coast (MSGC) transitioned into long-term recovery from Hurricane Katrina. Using thematic coding of 36 in-depth interviews conducted in both 2007/8 and 2013/14 with 21 CBO leaders from 15 different CBOs, this study found that CBOs must navigate a complex and often challenging political and economic context complicated by national policies and attitudes and local historical patterns. Despite these challenges, CBOs participated in LTR by acting as funding conduits, intermediary community-government actors, cross-sector collaborators, advocates, grassroots organizers, researchers, and government watchdogs. The most successful CBOs were those that developed CBO and cross-sector collaborations, diversified their funding, and added an advocacy component to their mission. The study concludes with a discussion of its implications for long-term disaster recovery research and policy.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

In the wake of recent national disasters, such as 9/11, hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and the Joplin tornadoes, community-based organizations (CBOs) have become crucial actors in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery in the United States (Pipa, 2006). CBOs deliver immediate disaster relief, providing communities and residents with basic necessities, such as food, water, and shelter (De Vita, 2006; Smith, 2012). As the affected area transitions into the recovery phase, CBOs become important distributors of recovery information and funds (Gajewski et al., 2011; Pipa, 2006). CBOs' value in immediate disaster relief (IDR) and short-term recovery (STR) is well established (Pipa, 2006). In fact, some researchers to argue that immediate disaster relief resources, as well as recovery funds and programs, should be handled by CBOs – "people on the ground" – rather than by disengaged, politically-motivated policy-makers at the federal level (Chamblee-Wright, 2007), while others caution that this bottom-up approach may lead to less federal government involvement in the disaster arena which may negatively impact CBOs' ability to function effectively in response and short-term recovery (Angel et al., 2012; Gajewski et al., 2011; Lein et al., 2009; & Smith, 2012). Despite these debates, most researchers and policy-makers agree that it is imperative to understand how increased reliance on CBOs during IDR and STR affects CBO operation and capacity.

However, this increased reliance on CBOs also has implications for long-term disaster recovery (LTR) – a time in which new community needs emerge as destabilized pre-disaster social and physical structures are reconstructed in unpredictable ways (CITE). Therefore, it is critical to understand the unique challenges and roles that CBOs play in LTR (Chandra & Acosta, 2009). Unfortunately, disaster research has been slower

to study CBO roles in LTR and how the increased reliance on CBOs during IDR and STR impacts CBOs' ability to transition from STR to long-term recovery (Chandra & Acosta, 2009). As CBOs continue to play more extensive roles in disaster relief and recovery, disaster researchers must strive to understand how organizations handle these roles while navigating long-term recovery.

The purpose of the proposed study is to understand the role that CBOs play in LTR by examining the ways in which CBOs on the Mississippi Gulf Coast (MSGC) have transitioned into LTR from Hurricane Katrina while simultaneously responding to and recovering from subsequent, consecutive disasters. This study uses network analysis, content analysis, and thematic coding of in-depth interviews to explore the ways in which CBOs on the MSGC are participating in, contributing to, and aaffected by long-term recovery. In particular, this study hopes to determine what challenges CBOs on the MSGC continue to face and what strategies have proven successful or not in responding to these challenges. In other words, just as it is important to understand the challenges, it is also important to identify key strategies and sources of successes. Conducted almost a decade after Hurricane Katrina, this study contributes to LTR research by examining one of the most important actors in disaster response and recovery – CBOs. Additionally, this study will demonstrate the value a community psychology approach can offer to disaster research, particularly with regard to CBOs in areas undergoing long-term recovery.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

CBOs' Value in Response and Short-term Recovery

CBOs have long filled service provision gaps where government social programs fall short (Steinberg, 2006). Recently, after some of the deadliest and costliest disasters in American history, CBOs also have filled gaps left by an overwhelmed national disaster response system, participating in both the immediate response and the subsequent recovery periods. Because they are well positioned to respond quickly and efficiently when disaster strikes, CBOs and their staff are often among the first responders (De Vita, 2006; Smith, 2012; Weber & Messias, 2012). They are quite literally the people closest to ground zero, making them essential players in the immediate response period. During STR, CBOs also provide connection to services, dissemination of information, and new services or programs to meet unmet needs. For example, CBOs on the MSGC as well as CBOs in communities receiving Katrina evacuees responded quickly and innovatively by developing new programs to help clients, who had fallen between the cracks, meet their emergent needs (Smith, 2012, Angel et al., 2012). Research suggests that in addition to being valuable assets in disaster response and recovery, CBOs also may be useful in community disaster preparedness (Nilsen, 2012) by disseminating information and providing disaster kits to clients. Thus, CBOs become valuable assets at many stages of disaster – preparedness, response, and short-term recovery.

CBOs are valuable assets because they have local knowledge of and are in close proximity to disaster-affected communities and often have the trust of community members. CBO staff consists of community members and leaders who work directly with the most vulnerable populations in the community and therefore, are keenly aware of

specific (and often complex) needs within the community (Smith, 2012). Not surprisingly, CBOs are also the entities most knowledgeable about existing community strengths and resources. Frequently, CBOs are connected to these resources or are directly providing them to the community. This local expertise allows for quicker and more efficient resource allocation by preventing spending time and resources "reinventing the wheel" or duplicating services (Pipa, 2006). Not only does CBOs' local knowledge make them valuable experts on their communities' strengths, needs, and resources, but it also can make CBOs experts on their constituents' culture. Therefore, CBOs can be helpful in identifying and communicating with hard-to-reach populations, which are often the most vulnerable residents. Distributing information to these hard-to-reach populations is one of the major struggles in disaster response and preparedness (Nilsen, 2012). CBOs can be used to distribute critical information to groups of people who are typically overlooked and who may be suspicious of outsiders and can also be used to make sure that the distributed information is culturally appropriate. Receiving culturally appropriate information from a trusted source increases the chance of community buy-in (Trickett, 2011). Receipt of information and buy-in can lead to increased community disaster preparedness and increased access to recovery resources. This advantage is incredibly important given that after Hurricane Katrina, the people who needed help the most, did not receive it, in part, because they were unaware of programs for which they were qualified (GAO, 2008).

In addition to their local knowledge, CBOs often have the trust of community residents. In fact, research shows community residents seem to trust CBOs more than governmental agencies. Along the Gulf Coast, many people – including some

government leaders – perceived NGOs and CBOs to be more effective in responding to Hurricane Katrina than local, state, and federal agencies (De Vita & Kramer, 2008; Pipa, 2006; & Weber & Messias, 2012). In part, this perception is due to the fact that CBOs are less bureaucratic (in Gajewski et al., 2011) and more flexible (Smith, 2012) – characteristics which allow CBOs to work faster and more efficiently than government agencies who are restricted by rigid policies and complicated bureaucratic processes. Speed and efficiency are especially important during the initial response period. CBOs also build community trust because as the disaster area moves into the recovery phase, CBOs remain invested in the community long after government programs end and national disaster relief organizations leave to attend to the next disaster (Pipa, 2006). This trust, along with CBOs' local knowledge and close proximity to the disaster area and the combination of rising needs and ineptitude of governmental response, has led communities and local and federal governments to continue to increasingly rely on CBOs during multiple phases of a disaster.

CBOs' Roles in Katrina Response and Recovery

Increased reliance on CBOs is perhaps most apparent in Katrina IDR and STR. A review of Katrina disaster literature illuminates three distinct roles that CBOs, on MSGC in particular, have played or can play in disaster preparedness, response, and short-term recovery: *cross-sector collaborators*, *funding conduits*, and *intermediary actors*. These roles are not mutually exclusive and often overlap. Notably, these roles all rely on CBOs' position at the intersection between the community and the institutional systems that impact individuals and communities. Though not without its challenges, this intersectional position allows CBOs the opportunity to use other advantages (e.g., local

knowledge, close proximity, and community trust) to channel funds and information across sectors in order to benefit communities undergoing response and recovery from disaster.

Not surprisingly, this intersectional position allows CBOs to participate in and develop *cross-sector collaborations*, which are "partnerships involving government, business, nonprofits and philanthropies, communities, and/or the public as a whole" (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006, p. 44). In disaster contexts, these collaborations increase coordination among entities involved in disaster response and recovery, and coordination between government and nongovernment agencies is essential to a successful response and recovery (Angel et al., 2012; Lein et al., 2006; Pipa, 2006). Additionally, cross-sector collaborations allow CBOs to combine their local knowledge with expert knowledge and monetary resources, and they enable CBOs to have access to policy/decision-makers, increasing CBOs' influence on decisions that affect the communities and the clients they serve. Therefore, including CBOs in cross-sector collaborations can arguably lead to increased community buy-in to disaster preparedness procedures and recovery processes. In other words, when CBOs have a seat at the table, they can better advocate for the community, and community members can be more confident that their interests are being represented. Ultimately, a government response to disaster is incomplete and ineffective without the help of CBOs, and CBOs cannot persist without access to government resources during times of extreme need (Angel et al., 2012) and cannot affect systems-level change without access to the key players. Cross-sector collaborations are good opportunities to combine expert knowledge and local knowledge in order to arrive at better solutions that are a good fit for each community. While cross-sector collaborations

have become essential, CBO involvement in long-term cross-sector collaborations in an "underspecified and under-researched area" (Simon and Bies, 2007, p. 140).

CBOs' intersectional position also encourages private and government agencies to use CBOs as *funding conduits*. During the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, international humanitarian relief organizations began funneling funds and resources to CBOs who were on the ground and could distribute funds quickly with limited bureaucracy (Gajewski et al., 2011; Pipa, 2006). Using CBOs as funding conduits also works as a checks and balances for the allocation of recovery resources, rendering resource and funds allocation more transparent and increases the chance that these resources will be directed to the community. Without accountability, recovery funds may not be used to benefit communities in need. In Mississippi, many federal funds were funneled through the governor's office, and when HUD funneled $5.481 billion through the governor's office (Defense Appropriations Act, 2006), much of this money went to fund the governor's economic development projects that did not directly benefit the most vulnerable populations for whom the money was originally dedicated (Weber & Smith, 2013). Using CBOs as funding conduits can lead to more equitable and efficient allocation of resources.

One of the most important ways that CBOs function is as *intermediate actors* that communicate important information across multiple sectors. CBOs can communicate federal and state regulations to the local community and educate residents on the recovery processes and disaster preparation. In addition to transferring information "down" from "experts," alternatively, CBOs also can transfer local information and concerns "up" to policy-makers. In this capacity, CBOs advocate for community

concerns as they arise during the recovery process. On the MSGC, CBOs who began as service providers became explicitly involved in advocacy in addition to their service provision either by adding advocacy to their mission or by joining advocacy collaborations. For example, the STEPS Coalition formed in 2008 in response to the dire housing need on the Coast and the coalition consisted of CBOs (Weber, 2014). One of its biggest successes includes forcing the state to return some of the money it had reallocated to a failed economic project to housing, resulting in a new housing program. Then, STEPS helped inform the community about the program. Their position at the intersection between system and community levels not only makes CBOs effective advocates but also makes them key conveyers of important information.

CBO Challenges

CBOs face multiple challenges that arise during IDR and STR that inhibit their ability to fill service gaps and function in both new and existing roles in disaster contexts. For example, CBOs must continue to meet clients' continuing and increasing needs while recovering themselves. In Mississippi, 93% of CBOs reported a loss of programs and services because of Hurricane Katrina (Mississippi Center for Nonprofits, n.d.). In the emergency phase of recovery (Kane, 1977), staff members and their families are in recovery and may be unable to return home and to work, resulting in staff shortages (CITE), burnout, and nefarious mental health effects (Weber & Messias, 2012). Additionally, CBOs must respond to and enact policies that they have little say or power in developing or changing, and progress is hindered by the lack of opportunity to take part fully in decision- and policy-making that effect CBOs and the communities that they serve. Both of these challenges often lead to staff disillusionment and burnout.

One of the biggest challenges that CBOs face during IDR and STR is lacking the organizational capacity and expertise necessary to respond to the increased demands that arise in IDR and STR. Disasters often demand changes in nature of services or development of new services altogether in order to meet emergent needs. Organizational capacity includes access to resources and funding and availability of staff. Lack of capacity coupled with increased demands limit CBOs' ability to carry out their main functions – service provision and/or advocacy – as well as their ability to engage in new roles, such as cross-sector collaborators, funding conduits, and intermediate actors. Cumulative effects of carrying out new services indefinitely without the capacity to do so in IDR can lead to negative and cumulative effects in STR and LTR. Often, those CBOs that do attempt to meet these demands without the capacity and expertise to do so, end up suffering long-term. Not only are CBOs unable to carry out primary functions or service provision and advocacy, but they also are unable to continue functioning as an organization. In New Orleans, after Hurricane Katrina, the number of CBOs dropped. Many cited lack of capacity and increased needs as contributing factors.

The nature of services change during a disaster context and CBOs do not have the expertise and resources to adapt to this change. Taking on new and crucial roles in both immediate disaster response and short-term recovery efforts (Pipa, 2006) often involves CBOs serving new types of clients and providing services that fall outside of their areas of expertise and for which they do not have the capacity to provide. Many CBOs are woefully unprepared for the roles they end up playing in disasters (Nilsen, 2012), and being organizationally prepared for disaster – i.e., having a disaster plan – does not mean that CBOs are prepared to provide disaster services outside the realm of their expertise

and capacity. For example, in the immediate response to Hurricane Katrina, CBOs on the Gulf Coast provided shelter and emergency disaster relief despite the fact that few of these organizations included disaster relief in their missions or had appropriate resources available for this type of disaster response (Pipa, 2006). In fact, as of October 5, 2005, Louisiana and Mississippi CBOs were sheltering almost as many people as the American Red Cross (ARC) (Pipa, 2006) but with arguably fewer resources and training than the ARC or other government organizations charged with disaster response (Smith, 2012). Because CBOs find themselves with a new client base and often meeting basic needs that are outside of the CBO's mission (Smith, 2012), CBOs also find themselves changing the nature of their services permanently (Auer & Lampkin, 2006; De Vita & Morley, 2007). This type of change can influence funding sources and staff. In addition to not having adequate training in disaster response (e.g., triage, working in hazardous conditions), CBOs lack the funding and staff to respond to the vast needs that arise. Even in-kind donations and managing volunteers are difficult without the capacity. Capacity and expertise are essential to CBO function in IDR and STR.

CBOs' degree of capacity and expertise in IDR has implications for their ability to engage in STR. Even those CBOs who have the capacity and expertise to successfully integrate disaster response into their mission, many CBOs often lack the capacity to carry out these new services indefinitely (Pipa, 2006). In the subsequent short-term recovery period, CBOs on the MSGC continued to provide services for individuals and communities who did not qualify for federal and state recovery programs without any compensation for these new services. Additionally, CBOs faced many and, often, unanticipated challenges in the initial response phase of a disaster that affected CBO

service provision in later short-term recovery. Despite being stretched beyond their initial capacity, many CBOs on the MSGC were not reimbursed for their services by FEMA or governments that greatly relied on these CBOs, which affected ability to CBOs' ability to provide disaster-related and regular services during the short-term recovery phase (GAO, 2008). Unfortunately, little research shows the effects on LTR.

Recognizing capacity limitations, disaster researchers and practitioners – including emergency responders, policy–makers, and government entities – agree that CBOs should be incorporated more explicitly and comprehensively into disaster preparedness, response, and recovery and that CBO capacity must be cultivated before and after a disaster (De Vita, Kramer et al., 2008; De Vita & Morley, 2007; Gajewski et al., 2011; GAO, 2008; & Pipa, 2006). For instance, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a GAO report (2008) recommended that FEMA increase their coordination with CBOs and contribute to capacity and to address funding issues of reimbursement. In a report for the Aspen Institute, Pipa (2006) recommended that policymakers increase funding and activities to include CBOs in decision-making and disaster training. Recognizing this limitation in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a 2008 GAO report recommended that funders allocate operational grants to keep local CBOs functioning during a disaster. Building CBO capacity pre-disaster and continuing to invest in capacity building post-disaster is crucial because during and after a disaster, CBOs must continue to serve constituents as well as recovery themselves – both on an institutional and individual level. Researchers and practitioners, alike, agree that CBOs have multiple advantages to offer at all stages of disaster and to multiple levels, including the individual, community, and governmental levels.

Gaps in the Literature

Despite recognizing that capacity affects the ability of CBOs to respond to disaster challenges and that continuing to provide services without the capacity to do so can lead to unresolved challenges in STR and LTR, disaster research has been slow to research CBOs' roles in long-term recovery and how CBOs continue to engage disaster recovery while negotiating their organization's identity in light of the new disaster context. For example, though we know that initially, CBOs offer services outside of their stated mention, scant research exists on if and how CBOs continue offering these services during long-term recovery. Knowing this information is crucial because donors during disasters are usually more interested in short-term recovery and relief and less interested in long-term recovery or administrative costs (in Gajewski et al., 2011) – both of which organizations cite as necessary (Nilsen, 2012). Additionally, despite the influx of volunteers during periods immediately after a disaster, these volunteers often decrease as time goes on (Smith, 2012) and are unequipped to deal with long-term recovery services, like job training (in Gajewski et al., 2011). Gawjewski et al. (2011) recommend that local nonprofits begin advocating at the federal level for long-term recovery and should encourage donors and the general public to donate to long-term recovery (Gajewski et al., 2011, USHCHS Democratic Staff Report, n.d.). First, research on how to best use these funds is necessary. Researchers and practitioners need an understanding of how CBOs continue to build capacity, the struggles they experience, and the roles that they play in long-term disaster recovery before we can develop best practices for CBOs serving areas undergoing long-term recovery.

In addition to navigating the effects of disasters on CBO mission and functioning, CBOs must also navigate changing socio-political contexts. Unfortunately, little research exists on this process in LTR. Disasters occur within a pre-existing socio-political context that can hinder or hurt certain CBOs agendas. The pre-existing context affects capacity building at individual, organizational, and community levels. Context determines who is affected by a disaster and who recovers and who does not recover (Weber, 2014). However, it is important to consider what happens when a disaster occurs and the context changes. Certain groups at these multiple levels stand to benefit or lose when familiar structures are no longer in place. Of course, disasters are necessarily political events (Klein, 2007). Disaster can be an opportunity to revise harmful structures in a way that is more advantageous to those groups previously disadvantaged. However, often what happens is that those who are already in power are able to achieve agendas that may be further harmful to disadvantaged populations by taking advantage of the momentary lapse in accountability and dismantling of the social structure (Klein, 2007). Renegotiating Identity/mission for LT within this context and often politically charged environment. It is important to understand the impact that the sociopolitical context has on long-term recovery efforts, and unfortunately little research is available.

Furthermore, scant research exists on how CBOs operate in areas that have experienced (or are at risk for experiencing) multiple disasters of various types. This gap is unfortunate given the fact that research shows that LTR is more complicated and takes longer after multiple disasters (Chandra & Acosta, 2009; Public Entity Risk Institute, 2009). Multiple disasters slow the recovery process because they often result in increased competing priorities with limited resources and prevalence in mental illness, which can

become compounded (Chandra & Acosta, 2009). It is important to understand how CBOs continue to make progress in areas that experience multiple disasters because many disaster-affected communities exist in geographic locations that increase their vulnerability to disasters, and therefore, the same community may experiences various types of disasters almost simultaneously. Because disaster risk is a combination of geographic, social, and political factors, many times the same geographic location or group of people are most vulnerable to disasters (Cutter, 2003). Disaster is not a static event but a continuation of ongoing inequalities and new struggles arise that can impede recovery. In other words, many communities will likely experience multiple disasters in a short amount of time, and these communities are often the most vulnerable and least capable of responding successfully. They will rely disproportionately on CBOs in their area.

In a rare investigation of long-term recovery and CBOS in Louisiana, Chandra and Acosta (2009) found that little federal support existed for CBOs working toward long-term human recovery. Instead, the federal government focused mostly on infrastructure and economic recovery. Additionally, CBOs struggled to find guidance and protocol for long-term case management. Chandra and Acosta (2009) concluded: "more investigation is warranted to determine NGOs' roles during recovery and to outline how government can better support NGOs in human recovery efforts" (p. 10). This study takes on this challenge and explores if CBOs in long-term recovery experience challenges similar to challenges faced in STR and examines new challenges and roles that emerge in LTR.

Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework

This study relies heavily on an ecological systems framework to explore and conceptualize CBOs' roles in long-term disaster recovery. Ecological frameworks recognize the interaction between the individual and his or her environment, arguing that human behavior is influenced by physical, social, economic, and political environments (Dalton, Elias, & Wandersman, 2001; Trickett, 1996). These environments function in terms of systems that interact with each other, and these systems include the micro-, meso-, exo-, macro-, and chronosystems that fan out concentrically from the individual. In Brofenbrenner's model (1979) this individual is the child and the systems make up the child's social ecology. Where the microsystem typically includes individuals and groups who have direct contact with the child (e.g., parents, friends, church, and school), the mesosystem includes interactions between multiple entities in the child's microsystem (e.g., parent-teacher and family-church interactions). The exosystem includes institutions, agencies, and structures that indirectly affect the child and his or her microsystems but with which the child does not have direct contact. Similarly, the child has no direct contact with the macrosystem, which consists of social, cultural, and political systems that affect other systems and levels within the model. Because of the nested nature of these levels, changes in one level produce changes in another level (Brofenbrenner, 1979). While Brofenbrenner's social ecological theory originally described a child's interaction with his or her environment, this model has been used by multiple disciplines to understanding how different systems affect each other across multiple levels and how they impact communities and individuals.

I build upon existing ecological systems frameworks by adapting them to more accurately reflect CBO involvement in disaster contexts. First, I augment Brofenbrenner's (1979) frameworks by incorporating aspects of Weber's (2010) feminist intersectionality framework – particularly its emphasis on power as a unit of analysis. This intersectionality framework describes social systems as power *relationships* that are simultaneously expressed at multiple levels. Because ecological systems are necessarily power-laden, power is an essential unit of analysis in intersectional frameworks (Weber, 2010). Without understanding the function of power, an analysis may miss important contextual and environmental factors that impact an individual or community. Therefore, research stemming from an intersectionality framework often uses discourse analysis to deconstruct ideologies and uncover power dynamics and political interests. A power analysis is especially useful in a disaster context, because disasters temporarily or permanently disrupt systems at multiple levels, and this disruption can be used to restructure the power relationships to benefit marginalized groups – or to further bolster those people and systems in power (Klein, 2007). Community organizations play an important role in this restructuring but do not operate outside these systems, placing them both in a potentially powerful or potentially vulnerable position simultaneously. Because they operate at the nexus of many of these systems and serve as the nexus between the community and the "powers-that-be," CBOs can be powerful advocates for marginalized groups. They also rely on resources and funds dependent upon these other levels. Therefore, understanding power dynamics among and between ecological systems is incredibly important when examining CBO's operating in a disaster context.

In addition to encouraging power as a unit of analysis, this intersectionality framework also emphasizes that systems across multiple levels are simultaneously expressed and are geographically and historically situated. Both ecological systems and intersectional theories recognize the importance of context; however, intersectionality framework emphasizes the historical and geographical contexts' influence on all relationships among and across systems. In other words, historical and geographical contexts are not located within a systems level. Rather, they impact the system's ecology (See Figure 1). This difference is important for understanding CBOs in a disaster context because it allows for studying how disaster changes these contexts and influences the relationships among systems. Within this framework, disaster is not an event in time that merely affects systems; it's a context or state within which ecological systems are situated.

My model attempts to capture this nuance, to represent CBOs' unique intersectional roles, and to create the opportunity to study the function of power and ideology within these systems. The model seeks to capture the disaster context as it gives rise to CBOs' cross-level roles by removing the chronosystem as a separate system operating outside of the model. Instead, the model is situated within historical and geographical context. Similar to Pfefferbaum and colleagues (2012) who noted that disasters "activate" the mesosystem to form linkages, I argue that disasters create a special context in which systems become unstable and CBOs emerge as entities that link and mediate across levels, functioning as cross-sector collaborators, funding conduits, and community-government liaisons and operating at the intersection of multiple levels of analysis. Perhaps the most notable difference is the model represents CBOs as cutting

across levels. Most ecological models locate CBOs within one level. For example, within Brofenbrenner's model, community-based and service organizations typically fit within the exosystem level of the framework. Some adaptations of the model include a "community-level" within which CBOs often fit (Kelly, 1968; Perkins, Silberman, & Brown, 2003). Others categorize CBOs as entities that facilitate mesosystem interactions (Pfefferbaum et al., 2012). In order to more accurately reflect CBOs' unique intersectional roles in a disaster context, my model conceptualizes CBOs as entities that cut across levels rather than as firmly located within any one system. Therefore, my framework represents CBOs in disasters as intersecting multiple levels, part of and influenced by power relationships among and across systems, and placed within a geographically and historically situated context defined or marked by disaster.



Figure 1. Ecological Systems Framework



Figure 2: CBOs Disaster Ecological Model

Chapter 4. Current Investigation

Employing this framework, this applied research study sought to understand CBOs' experiences with long-term recovery in an effort to inform policy and research. It concentrated on CBOs on the Mississippi Gulf Coast (MSGC) because the MSGC is currently undergoing LTR from Hurricane Katrina, has experienced multiple disasters of varying types, and has a unique political context, offering the opportunity to address gaps in research. Less than a month after Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 2005, Hurricane Rita struck the MSGC, followed by Hurricane Gustav in 2008, and Hurricane Isaac in 2009. In addition to hurricanes, the housing and economic crisis of 2008 critically affected the Coast. Because the area was already impoverished, the economic crisis effects were even more significant. In 2010, the Deepwater Horizon (BP) Oil Spill, though causing little structural damage, further suppressed the economy by hindering the tourism and Vietnamese fishing industries, leading to rising unemployment and decreased tax revenue. Despite these multiple disasters, preliminary analysis of 2013 qualitative interviews suggested that CBOs on the MSGC have managed to continue to grow and build capacity. In fact, more CBOs exist on the Coast today than pre-Katrina (NCCS, 2014). Additionally, data suggested that the Coast has more cross-sector collaborations post-Katrina than before the storm. Given the number and severity of these disasters and the effects that they have had on an already impoverished area, understanding how these CBOs have continued to thrive can inform how researchers and practitioners approach and manage other domestic disasters.

In addition to thriving despite multiple disasters, CBOs on the MSGC are operating within a unique socio-political context. Therefore, focusing on this area offers

the opportunity to explore the effects of socio-political context on LTR and how power dynamics affect CBO operation. Situated within a republican state, the MSGC considers itself more "liberal" and "cosmopolitan" than the rest of the state. CBO leaders on the MSGC felt that the Coast's more moderate political leanings put it at odds with the state's conservative government and rising Tea Party movement (Weber & Smith, 2013). Additionally, the Coast considers itself to be different from the rest of the state socio-economically, racially, and educationally. Indeed, it is more racially diverse than the rest of the state, and despite being a "working coast," with socio-economic and education levels well below the national averages, the Coast does have much higher socio-economic status and education levels than the rest of the state (US Census, 2010). Despite these differences from the rest of the state, in some ways, the conservative government worked to advantage the Coast because Governor Barbour, who had close ties with President Bush, managed to secure a disproportionate amount of federal money for Mississippi in the period following Katrina (Weber & Smith, 2013). Focusing on CBOs on the MSGC not only allowed me to explore how this unique context changed after subsequent disasters, but it also allowed me to examine if and how CBOs navigated the complex power dynamics in this recovery process.

Research Questions

Because this study is one of the first to examine CBOs undergoing LTR, the research approach was largely exploratory. In order to address gaps in current research, this study explored the following questions concerning CBOs on the MSGC:

1. What changes has LTR had on the economic, political, social, and physical environment on the MSGC, and how have these changes affected CBOs' operation?
2. How are CBOs on the MSGC participating in and contributing to LTR?
3. How is LTR affecting CBOs' ability to build capacity and provide services and to the community?
4. Does CBOs' involvement in a collaborative network increase CBO power to participate in and affect LTR?

Based on existing research, I expected that CBOs on the MSGC would have experienced significant changes in operation due to changes in the economic, political, social, and physical environment. Furthermore, I predicted that CBOs on the MSGC would continue to be important players in LTR from Hurricane Katrina by serving as cross-sector collaborators, funding conduits, and community-government liaisons. Additionally, those CBOs that have continued to be players would be those organizations that have been able to overcome challenges associated with short-term recovery and long-term recovery. Ultimately, I anticipated that CBOs who have continued to be players in LTR would be those CBOs who were more involved in both pre-disaster and post-disaster collaborations and who were highly connected to other organizations and sectors.

Chapter 5. Methods

This study involved two phases of data collection, including data from an original study conducted in 2007 and 2008 as part of a 2007 National Science Foundation grant looking at inequalities in recovery on the Mississippi Gulf Coast (Grant CMMI-0623991) as well as a follow-up study in 2013 and 2014 (USC Provost Grant, 2012). The first study took an exploratory approach, gathering data across multiple groups involved in recovery from Hurricane Katrina. Using purposeful sampling and snowballing techniques, researchers identified and interviewed 56 key leaders and residents involved in disaster recovery in Gulfport, Biloxi, Diamond Head, Pass Christian, Waveland, and Bay St. Louis from Hancock and Harrison County. These towns were chosen because of their proximity to landfall and the amount of damage incurred (Figure 3). Though all within thirty miles of each other, these towns varied in terms of size and socio-economic makeup. Key findings from this initial study included:

- Because of their insider/outsider status, NGOs and CBOs played a crucial role in multiple stages of recovery: as first responders and as community members invested in long-term recovery. However, CBO workers experienced physical and mental distress because of insufficient resources and capacity to deal with emerging and exacerbated needs and the difficulty of navigating socio-political processes (Weber & Messias, 2011).
- Power dynamics benefitting a government/business alliance governed decision-making and kept needed resources out of local communities (Weber, 2014).
- CBOs leveraged their collective power to affect decision-making by forming an advocacy coalition – Steps Coalition (Weber, 2014; www.stepscoalition.org).



Figure 3. Mississippi Gulf Coast Damage Estimates.

*Retrieved 15 Jun 2015 from:
http://www.southernspaces.org/sites/southernspaces.org/files/images/2008/1a-002-ss-08-katrina_lg.gif

The second phase involved a 2013/14 follow-up study that attempted to reconnect with previous participants in order to examine the long-term recovery experiences of CBOs on the Gulf Coast after subsequent disasters. Based on findings from the previous study, researchers chose to focus more intensely on the experiences of community-based organizations. In addition to CBOs, the follow-up study, using snowballing and theoretical sampling, recruited organizations not represented in the first study and new organizations that had emerged in the previous three years. Unlike the original study, the follow-up study emphasized depth over breadth, focusing on the CBO sector.

Data and Units of Analysis

The data used in the present study consisted of 72[1] transcribed semi-structured interviews, public documents, and field notes collected from both the original and follow-up studies.[2] Zooming in on organizations and their context, the present study focused on the CBOs who participated in both 2007 and 2013 follow-up studies, resulting in 21 unique participants from 15 organizations. These data allowed for inquiry at individual,

[1] Includes 6-month follow-ups in 2008 for 3 participants. Also, considers interviews with two participants as one interview.
[2] Interview guides for both studies are included in the appendix.

organizational, and socio-political environment levels of analysis. The following sections describe the data used to inform each level of analysis.

Individuals. A total of 73 unique individuals participated in the 2008 and 2013 studies. These individuals included key leaders in recovery from the business community, local and state governments, university community, and nonprofit community. Fifty-six percent (56%) of participants were women (n=41). Forty-three (43) of these key leaders worked for CBOs. Of these 43 CBO leaders, 13 participants were interviewed in both 2008 and 2013, allowing for a longitudinal analysis of the process of recovery for those individuals. This study also includes 8 interviewees whose organizations participated in both studies, but they themselves only participated in either 2007 only (n=3) or 2013 only (n=5). Because of staff turnover, the same representatives/interviewees from each CBO was not always possible. Figure 4 illustrates the breakdown of individuals.



Figure 4. Individuals from 2007/8 and 2013/14 Interviews Included in Current Study

Of the 21 participants, 62% were female (n=13) and 38% were male (n=8). The majority (62%) of participants were White (n=13). African American and Latino/a participants each made up 14% of respondents respectively (n_{AA}=3, n_{Lat}=3). These breakdowns were similar to Census Bureau data at that time that shows Biloxi to be 64%

White, 19% African American, and 9% Latino/a. Therefore, this sample had slightly more Latino/a representation and slightly less African American representation (2010). See Figures 5 and 6 below. Twelve of the 21 participants were executive directors of their organizations. The other 9 interviewees had overlapping roles that included advocacy, organizing, and service provision.



Figure 5. Participant Racial Percentages (n=21)



Figure 6. Biloxi Racial Percentages (US Census, 2010)

Organizations. A total of 43 people were interviewed from 32 organizations in both 2007/8 and 2013/14. Of these organizations, 46.9% participated in both studies (n=15); 37.5% participated in the first study only (n=12); and 15.6% participated in the second study only (n=5). The majority of the 12 previously interviewed organizations that did not participate in the second study were either no longer viable organizations (n=5); no longer had a presence on the Gulf Coast (i.e., were located elsewhere and had temporary branches on Coast only immediately after Katrina, n=5); or were unable to meet with interviewers due to scheduling conflicts (n=2). Researchers made extensive efforts to contact these 12 organizations and/or their former leaders because their perspective would greatly enhance the study. However, many former leaders had left the coast, and research assistants were unable to locate them. Thankfully, the follow-up study

did include the perspective of organizations representative of these two types of organizations – defunct or removed.



Figure 7. CBOs from 2007/8 and 2013/14 Interviews Included in Current Study

The 15 organizations that participated in both studies included both pre-Katrina and post-Katrina organizations. Eight organizations were primarily service organizations and six were primarily advocacy organizations (one organization was a lender/educational organization). However, seven organizations were explicitly involved in both advocacy and service, and many others engaged informally in both, even though their mission statements may privilege one or the other focus. The majority of the participating organizations was housing organizations or at least involved a housing component (n=9). Additionally, most CBOs were located in Biloxi (n=11) or Gulfport (n=4).

Relying on variations of existing definitions for CBOs, the study considered CBOs to be organizations that are: 1) non-profit; 2) non-governmental; 3) secular or faith-based; and 4) provide either direct services and/or advocacy for individuals (Austin, 2012). The classification included advocacy organizations because these organizations know the needs of various niche groups in the community and may connect individuals to direct services. It also included local branches of national organizations but not

extensions of national organizations that did not have a permanent presence in the community.

Socio-political environment. In tandem with conducting interviews, research assistants collected and examined numerous public and government documents and newspaper articles and observed community meetings in an effort to understand the context and political dynamics within the community. The majority of documents included the state's recovery "Action Plans" published on the Mississippi Development Authority's (MDA) website, United States Housing and Urban Development (HUD) documentation available on the HUD website, and state and local newspaper articles. Along with interviews, these documents helped reconstruct the socio-political environment within which CBOs were operating at multiple levels, including local, state, and national levels.

Researchers' Positionality

Keeping with my commitment to feminist intersectionality, I recognize the impact of my own positionality on data collection and analysis. In the spirit of self-disclosure and reflexivity: I am white female from the American South. At the time of the study, I was in my late twenties and had lived in the South all of my life. Therefore, I was well acquainted with southern rural culture and had a heavy accent, making me easily accepted into the community of interest. I was drawn to this study, in part, because of a commitment to social advocacy and also because I had a traumatic experience with a natural disaster as a child. In 1989, Hurricane Hugo devastated my hometown, a rural impoverished area in South Carolina. Unlike the MSGC, this area had little assistance from CBOs because no CBOs or formal service networks existed. The area received little

government assistance and, arguably, is still recovering. This study also interested me because of the high amount of women working in CBO leadership roles on the MSGC. I feel a commitment to show the often under-appreciated work of women in their communities and the power they garner through collaboration.

The other two interviewers for the 2013 study were white women in their sixties. One of these interviewers was born and raised in the South, and the other interviewer had lived in the South for over 20 years. The interviewers from the 2008 study included two white male graduate students and two white females – one graduate student and one professor – all from the University of South Carolina. While I collaborated with some of these researchers in brainstorming themes and initial coding in 2013/4, the following analysis is my own.

Analysis

This study examined interviews and documents using thematic coding informed by my CBO Disaster Ecological Systems Framework. This qualitative method was useful for examining data at multiple levels – individual, organizational, community, and socio-political levels – as well as for understanding the operation of power across and within these levels. To address the first research question regarding context, I focused on codes dealing with context and power in all interviews and public documents from 2007/8 to 2013/4. Because I was interested in the overall context, I included interviews from all respondents, including business and government interviewees at this initial step. To understand CBOs' roles and operation in long-term recovery (research questions 2 and 3), I focused primarily on the CBO interviews from 2013. However, I compared codes on CBO operation and roles in 2008 with 2013 in order to understand how these changed.

Finally, in order to examine the nature of CBO collaborations and CBOs' ability to garner power in LTR (research question four), I examined codes from both 2007/8 and 2013/4 concerning ties to other CBOs and entities across sectors. I also examined public documents to a get a sense of their visibility in the community. See Table 1 for a breakdown of research questions and methods.

Research Question	**Data Source**	**Method**	**Software**
1. What changes has LTR had on the economic, political, social, and physical environment on the MSGC?	• All 2007/8 & 2013/4 interviews • Public Documents	• Thematic coding • Review of documents	• NVivo
1. How are CBOs on the MSGC participating in and contributing to long-term recovery?	• 2013/4 CBO interviews	• Thematic coding	• NVivo
2. How is long-term recovery affecting CBOs' ability to build capacity?	• 2013/4 CBO interviews	• Thematic coding	• NVivo
3. Does CBOs' involvement in a collaborative network increase CBO power to participate in and affect LTR?	• 2007/8 and 2013/4 CBO interviews • CBO websites • Public documents • NCCS database	• Thematic coding • Review of documents	• NVivo

Table 1. Analysis by Research Question

I began the analysis by reading through all interview transcripts for both 2007/8 and 2013/4, including business leader and government leader interviews, taking notes of emerging themes and questions in my project journal. I sketched a rough coding framework that contained broad themes, filling them in with sub-nodes as I went along. Then using NVivo software, I coded 2007/8 CBO interviews, starting with a couple of

"typical" interviews that contained many of the themes I identified in the first read-through. I used an open coding, coding *in vivo* for emergent themes. I also used *a priori* codes developed from the research questions, interview schedule, and my initial read-through. After coding 2007/8 interviews, I moved to 2013/4 interviews using a similar strategy. I created memos as I coded to help generate ideas and potential frameworks and also to help track the coding process. I coded by interview rather than by theme/code because this strategy helped me keep the "big picture" in the forefront of my mind during coding. This strategy also assisted analysis in highlighting for me where certain processes and issues that were affecting CBOs (and that they were affecting) were "located". In other words, this strategy helped me "define the problem" more contextually.

As codes became saturated and new codes stopped emerging, I collapsed both emergent codes and *a priori* codes into themes that I arranged into a paradigm that reflected my proposed CBOs Disaster Ecological Model. Therefore, about halfway through coding the 2007/8 interviews, I organized the codes based on the different levels within the model. Initially, I grouped existing codes into 6 levels – or "parent nodes" in NVivo: "Context," "Macrosystem," "Exosystem," "Mesosystem," "Microsystem," and "Individual." I also included a "CBO" level. I soon realized that codes might belong to more than one level or parent node. For example, while mental health may be expressed at an individual level, many interviewees discussed it as a community-level phenomenon and affected by micro-, meso-, and macro-level phenomena, showing that this code exists at multiple levels. Additionally, "Feelings and Attitudes" can work across levels such that an individual can have attitudes about government and CBOs; communities can have attitudes about and toward government and individuals; and governments can have

attitudes about certain communities and individuals. Finally, interviewees referred to certain events that impacted every level. For example, the Great Recession, the 2008 housing crisis, and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Therefore, I added "Multiple Levels," "Across Levels," and "Events" codes to capture themes that cut across, exists between, or impacts all levels. By organizing codes this way, I hoped to illustrate the usefulness of my model. This strategy also helped me begin to think contextually at the early stages of analysis.

Analysis of public documents from HUD, the MDA, local and national newspapers, legal records, and CBO website content proceeded a bit differently. While I did not engage in systematic coding of these documents, I did use them to track government funds and to inform my understanding of the political context. For example, in the interviews, discrepancies emerged between community leaders in different sectors (i.e., government, business, and CBOs). One discrepancy regarded the diversion of money from a housing recovery program to an economic development project at the Port of Gulfport. CBO leaders, while not necessarily opposed to the Port, did not approve of the diversion of funds from a housing program to an economic development project because of widespread unmet housing needs. Business leaders insisted that the money was always earmarked for the Port and that CBO leaders "just did not understand the way funds were allocated." An (extensive) investigation of public documents between MDA and HUD revealed that the money was indeed diverted from the Housing Assistance Program (MDA, 2006a; MDA 2007; & Weber & Smith, 2012). While the goal of this project was not necessarily to investigate recovery funds and allocation, having access to these documents helped me understand the intense research process that CBO leaders

went through to keep on top of recovery processes as well as helped me to understand the ways in which certain stories about recovery were being perpetuated and what purpose they served and for whom.

Therefore, the majority of analysis involved thematic coding and content analysis of interviews and documents by the primary researcher. While analysis is based on one coder, a research assistant did assist with checking the reliability of my final coding structure based on the Disaster Ecological Systems model. She coded some of the more representative interviews using the coding framework. When comparing our coding, we achieved high agreement for sections coded (with a Kappa > 96 for all codes). Although the codes were mine, this finding implies that multiple users using this codebook can produce reliable codes. Please see Appendix I for codebook.

Chapter 6. Results

Results are presented much like the analysis, with a focus on context first. In order to investigate the way CBOs operate in LTR, I first needed to understand the context within which CBOs were working and simultaneously impacting. Understanding this context was pivotal to understanding the challenges and successes of the CBOs on the Mississippi Gulf Coast and the LTR processes in which they were participating. Therefore, the results section begins with a detailed analysis of the socio-political, economic, historical, and geographic context and its implications for CBOs and then proceeds to examine CBOs' roles in LTR situated within this context. I address the remaining research questions pertaining to LTR impacts on CBOs by discussing CBOs' challenges and successes throughout these sections. Most of these challenges, and subsequently, CBOs' strengths, emerged in relation to the disaster context and the roles they played. I emphasize CBO collaborations as they emerged as one of the strengths of CBOs. While interviewees brought up many important and complex themes, particularly with regard to context and their roles in it, I discuss only those that have the strongest implications for understanding CBO operation in LTR.

Context and Macrosystem Influences

			Interview Coverage	
Eco-Level	**Theme**	**Sub-theme**	# References	#Interviews
Context	Historical		41	18
	Political/Economic		164	29
		*National	58	23
		*State	71	22
		*Local	48	18
	Geographical/Physical		15	7
Macrosystem	Racism		88	26
Context x Macrosystem	*Historical x Racism-History of Racism*		*17*	*11*
		**Perception of racism*	*6*	*6*
		**Effects of racism*	*9*	*8*

Table 2. Interview Coverage for "Contextual" and "Macrosystem" Influences
* Child nodes can overlap.

To examine changes in the socio-political and economic context within which CBOs are located, I reviewed text coded for "context" in both 2013 and 2007 interviews, looking for similarities and differences. I divided "Context" into three main "child nodes": "Geographical/Physical Context," "Historical Context," and "Political/Economic Context." The "Political/Economic Context" code had by far the most coded references (n=343 across 29 different interviews), followed by "Historical Context" (n=42 across 19 interviews), and then "Geographical/Physical Context" (n=15 across 7 interviews). Upon review, "Political/Economic Context" also could be divided into three child nodes: "National," "State." and "Local."[3] Often, these nodes overlapped and intersected. For example, "National," "State," and "Local" political/economic context child nodes were

[3] The same local, state, and national division arguably could apply to "Historical Context" and "Geographical/Physical Context" codes. However, these distinctions did not surface in interviews for these nodes.

dependent on each other even while they diverged. The change in presidential administrations from Republican to Democrat in 2008 illuminated the ways in which Mississippi state politics were both dependent on and diverged from national politics. Similarly, historical context impacted present-day geographical context and political/economic context. Also, these nodes overlapped with other levels; for example, racism, located in the macrosystem level of my coding structure, overlapped with all three context sub-nodes. In order to establish relevant context, first, I present themes that ran across both time points and then discuss the contextual changes between the two time points, relating these data back to CBO operation on the Gulf Coast, beginning with historical context.

History of racism/segregation. One of the most common themes throughout all of the interviews concerned racism, and this theme often overlapped with historical context. In fact, forty-three percent (43%) of historical context references were also coded as racism. Of course, "racism" can refer to many different discriminatory behaviors, attitudes, and practices, which are all important, but I am interested in the references in which racism and historical context overlap. Throughout the interviews, leaders emphasized that Mississippi's history of racism[4] was relevant to the Coast's recovery from Hurricane Katrina. Analysis highlighted two themes that describe the ways in which a history of racism impacted the Coast. These themes include outsiders' perception of racism and the effects of racism. In other words, Mississippi's racial history

[4] Interviewees did not elaborate on specific details of this history. Often the interviewees assumed the interviewer was acquainted with Mississippi's history. Several interviewees did mention the history of segregation but only vaguely. Therefore, this study analyzes perceptions (and perceptions of perceptions) and not actual historical events.

led to an outsider perception of racism as well as to institutionalized racism that had impacts for CBOs and the community.

History of Racism	CBO Effects
Outsiders' perceptions	Difficulty retaining and recruiting staff; decreased funds from national foundations; emotional distress
Effects of history of racism	Segregation led to discriminatory practices in recovery; CBOs struggle to fill service gaps for those minorities left out of recovery.

Table 3. History of Racism Effects on CBOs

Perception of racism. One of the more common themes that emerged under historical context dealt with how Mississippi's history affected outsiders' perceptions of the state and how these perceptions impacted CBOs. For example, CBO leaders felt that outsiders – including national funding foundations, international and national nonprofits, and even individuals professionals and volunteers – perceived Mississippi to be "backwards," "racist," and "uneducated." Interviewees blamed these perceptions on Mississippi's history of racism and the state government's devaluing of public education, social services, and healthcare. Regardless of the current state of racism on the Coast (many interviewees asserted that the Coast was "less racist" and "more educated" than the rest of the state), the perceived impact of this public perception loomed large in the interviews. Interviewees emphasized that these perceptions had real-world consequences on present-day Mississippi Gulf Coast CBOs by limiting access to funding and discouraging recruitment of professional staff. The history of Mississippi both in terms of racism and its reputation for its low national rankings in healthcare and education made it difficult for organizations to retain employers and to recruit employers from out-of-state. For example, one community health center executive director explained:

> It's very difficult for us and everyone else down here, to recruit. When you say Mississippi, that takes about half of them out right there because they've heard for years about Mississippi being number one or number fifty, whatever it is you want to talk about. So that stops about half of them, and then you get to coastal Mississippi, and they think of hurricanes. Then you have a very small pool to recruit from that want to come down here. Then the ones here, as I mentioned the mental health and all these other issues, we have trouble retaining staff.
>
> - Community Health CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

Given that CBOs increasingly must rely on external support and outside expertise to be sustainable, this finding is troubling. Additionally, this quote, in particular, illustrated the intersection of geographic location with historical context. In this case, they intersected to produce negative perceptions of the Coast as a geographically vulnerable location still plagued by racism. However, many interviewees pointed out that once outsiders visited the Coast, they found their perceptions inaccurate and often chose to stay.

Interviewees explained that Mississippi's history also affected how large funding organizations decided to allocate their funds. For example, one national funding organization refused to fund any organizations that existed prior to Katrina. They reasoned that pre-Katrina CBOs had been unable to respond successfully to racism and therefore, were ineffective at best and "part of the problem" at worst. Not only did this punitive response restrict access to much-needed funds for CBOs who were well established and well positioned to help the community, but it also caused emotional distress for leaders already experiencing burnout and mental health issues (Weber & Messias, 2011). As one CBO leader put it in 2007:

> …we were shut out of any funding from these major funders. They won't even, because we're, you know – what they're really focused on is structural racism. Well, that's what our organization is about. As a matter of fact, that's what we're doing. We're breaking down these barriers. I mean, you know? So it's been very difficult. I have cried actually nights about this because to sit in these meetings and on the [CBO] board and have [International Organization] and [National Funding Organization] come and tell us we're not aware of structural racism, and

> we must have been part of the problem since things were so bad before, sit there. It's embarrassing. It's really hurtful.
>
> - Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2007

This organization was having the same problem in 2013 with different funding organizations, showing the persistence of this mentality over time and the demoralizing effect it had on CBO leaders.

> You had those large – we saw a lot of money go to brand new nonprofits because the assumption was those of us who had been around and had achieved some really good things, that we were racist, and we had not been successful in the past.
>
> - Housing/Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013

Outsiders' assumptions based on Mississippi's racial history continued to have harmful impacts throughout STR and LTR, presenting problems for CBOs trying to recruit outside professionals and secure external funding.

Effects of racism. CBO leaders noted that Mississippi's history of racism impacted more than just outsiders' perceptions – it had present-day impacts on the Coastal communities. Interviewees noted that the Coast was still very segregated. Interviewees explained that African Americans and White people continued to occupy different spaces in the community, allowing for the inequitable distribution of resources and discriminatory practices along these lines. For instance, one of the themes that emerged during coding was the perception that the (predominantly white) Biloxi government was consistently disinvesting in historically African American communities, like East Biloxi. An often-cited example included the closing of a high performing East Biloxi school. In 2010, the Biloxi School Board, facing decreased enrollment citywide, decided to close several of its schools. One of the schools it chose to close was Nichols Elementary School, the highest performing school in the state that had just been rebuilt and equipped with new technology (MCJ, 2016). Public perception on the Coast was that

this decision was racially motivated. Nichols was 90% minority and located in a predominantly Black community. Of the schools chosen to stay open: Jefferson Davis, a school built in the 1950s and named for a confederate general (Brown, 2010). One community leader questioned why the board chose to close Nichols, a newly renovated school, instead of one of the other older schools, feeling that it was because white parents did not want their children to attend school in a historically black community:

> Now, you gonna take the school that cost you $25 million, brand new school that's, wired for computers, all the new technology, and you're going keep a school open down there that's been built in 1950 where you got trailers on it. That didn't make no sense…all that [closing Nichols] was to keep the white kids out of the black community. "I would rather send my child to an old 1950's school in a white community than to send them to a state-of-the-art school that's in a predominantly black community."
>
> - Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African American male, 2013

Since the school's closing, the community has organized a grassroots campaign to advocate for reopening the school, which was seen as the pride of the East Biloxi community. This example is one of many ongoing racial struggles in the community.

Mississippi's racial history also intersected with geographic context in that segregation's lingering effects impacted where people lived and what type of damage they were likely to experience from the storm as well as what type of assistance they were likely to receive. For instance, one of the economic development projects funded with recovery funds was the development of the Port of Gulfport, which involved building a road slated to cut through wetlands and an African American community. One CBO leader explained that the burden from this project would be disproportionately borne by African American communities:

> And there's also an environmental justice dimension to it in that the Port would be connected to the interstate highway system through an expressway that originally was proposed to divide a majority African-American community and would cause

> flooding problems and air pollution problems, and so, we've fought that, and at this point, the permit for that highway – that expressway – has been pulled, and it is under reevaluation.
>
> -Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

Therefore, both disaster and its recovery played out along geographic lines that were racialized. Another example raised by interviewees was the state's initial decision to provide assistance only to homeowners with insurance who had received storm surge damage, the type of damage that was most likely received by wealthy white landowners who could afford to live on the oceanfront. Renters and homeowners without insurance who received wind damage were left out of initial recovery assistance. The latter group most often included low-income African Americans as explained by one advocate:

> The State of Mississippi chose only to provide Homeowner Assistance Grants to people who had storm surge damage and not to people who just had hurricane wind damage. Well, hurricane is both wind and storm water, and we said that was unfair and wrong, and Louisiana wasn't doing that, and so, nor should Mississippi. Besides which, the way that the Gulf Coast was laid out with a rail bed that was laid down in the 19th century, and that rail bed helped to produce sort of a racially segregated pattern of settlement that persisted on up to the 21st century. If you were on the south side of the tracks, the White side of the tracks, you were going get storm surge damage, but the rail bed would hold back the storm surge, and if you were on the north side of the tracks, just a few blocks away from the shore, it would be majority Black communities, and they would get nothing. I said, "We can't allow that to happen."
>
> - Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

A review of MDA documents revealed that the state did indeed prioritize homeowners with insurance who had experienced storm surge (MDA, 2006b). Throughout the recovery process, renters continued to be the most neglected group. Renters did not receive state assistance until 2014, almost ten years after the storm, and service providers agreed that it was too little too late (MDA, 2010; Robertson, 2010). CBOs were left to fill in the gaps for low-income, often minority, individuals who did not qualify for recovery assistance, usually without any additional resources to do so.

While many CBO leaders denied the presence of overt, personal racism, all interviewees emphasized the impact of a history of racism – in the form of outsiders' perceptions of Mississippi and the lingering effects of segregation – on individuals, communities, and CBOs on the Coast. Of course, some interviewees did point to overt racism, most of which they identified at an institutional (exosystem) level. The interviewee below explained that the history of racism in Mississippi continues to be ongoing in the present, though it looks different than it did in the past:

> Yeah, well down here, of course everybody knows the history of Mississippi. And unfortunately that's a bad label that's stuck and there's many people who vocalize it openly that there's still that mentality within that they don't want to address the issue – they try to keep it hidden – racism. They no longer wear the white hoods and sheets – they wear now ties and white shirts.
>
> - Latino Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latino male, 2007

According to interviewees, Mississippi's history of racism continued to play out implicitly and explicitly in the uneven experience of disaster and recovery, and this uneven recovery presented certain challenges for CBOs who had to fill in the gaps for minority groups left out of recovery assistance.

Political/Economic context. In addition to historical context, the political and economic context of the MSGC, had implications for CBOs working in LTR. This context both presented challenges and provided certain benefits to communities and CBOs. The differentiation of national, state, and local context political/economic contexts is helpful in understanding the context CBOs navigated in LTR. While CBO leaders spoke most often about local and state context, they still emphasized the impact of the national political and economic context on the local context, CBO operations, and recovery generally. Though presented in separate sections, national, state, and local political and economic context codes overlapped with each other and with other

contextual codes (i.e., geographic and historical), which I will demonstrate as I discuss each level.

Political/Economic Context		CBO Effects
National		
	Instability of economy	Decrease in public/private funds; Uncertainty for future sustainability
State		
	Plantation Economy	Lack of voice in recovery processes; difficult to navigate power dynamics
	Gov. Barbour's power	No oversight on recovery $; inability to direct recovery $ to those who most needed it; large sums of federal funds to MS
	Business-friendly economy	Less money available for programs to benefit CBOs' communities
	Insular culture	Distrust of outsiders supported "good ole boy" power dynamic that was difficult for CBOs to navigate
Local		
	Business interests privileged	Less funds available for CBO projects to benefit the community; economic projects actually hurt CBOs' communities
	Illusion of Voice	Led to frustration, disillusionment, and lack of trust; wasted valuable time
	Recovery structured to benefit protected classes	Challenge to enforce accountability for recovery $ and to ensure it benefitted those in need

Table 4. Political/Economic Context Effects on CBOs

National level. Interviewees in both 2007 and 2013 interviews showed an awareness of the impact of the national economic and political climate on the community and their work. For the most part, interviewees explained the ways in which this context presented challenges for their organizations. The instability of the overall national economy – particularly, the Great Recession and the housing market crisis – led to a decrease in available federal and private funds for CBOs and created a general uncertainty about the future. CBO leaders noted that the recession and the federal government greatly impacted their work and communities:

> It's a double whammy. It's the whammy of Katrina plus the national economic scene. You know, it's just not Katrina. Now it's the national economics.
>
> - Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2007

> And in part it's a recognition that, with the recession and the pull back in government funding, it's very difficult to have enough scale in what we're doing to make a difference in our community.
>
> - CBO, Director of Initiatives, White female, 2013

This uncertainty was troubling for many CBOs given their belief that their sustainability depended, in part, on federal policies and national economic stability. When asked about the future of their organization and community, CBO leaders in both time periods pointed to national government as *the* deciding factor:

> The federal government – in terms of whoever that President's gonna be the next time we elect one, how he affects the economy in terms of getting money rolling again.
>
> –Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African American male, 2007

> I think the biggest wild card in all of this is Congress. And if more money is pulled out of social services, it, and it won't just be the coast, I just think the, all of us will be in really bad shape.
>
> -CBO, Director of Initiatives, White female, 2013

Though the ways in which the national context affected CBOs' work on the Coast differed slightly between 2007/8 and 2013/4, the commonality was an awareness of the pervasive impact of a national context and that this context was mostly categorized by uncertainty.

State level. CBO leaders also acknowledged the impact of the state political and economic context on their CBOs. However, they did not see this context as uncertain but as more fixed, following previously set historical patterns. These patterns could be traced to Mississippi's history of what one interviewee called a "plantation economy". Interviewees described the wealth in Mississippi as concentrated in the hands of a few and explained that these few were the people who made the decisions. Recognizing the

intersection of history and political/economic context, one interviewee argued that this "oligarchy of wealth" was prevalent even at the local level on the Gulf Coast:

> … but I do believe that we live in the ongoing plantation economy in Mississippi in the sense we have an oligarchy of wealth. They would have been landowners previously, but now they're corporate business owners that pretty much hold sway. And you can see this here on the Gulf Coast. Who is it that's the head of Mississippi and the president of the bank? These are the important people. The only important people are the movers and the shakers or the people that have money. And that's basically the decision makers…That's what kind of place we have here: those who make decisions and the rest of us. Well, there's a whole bunch of rest of us in Mississippi. There's a huge population of the rest of us.
>
> - Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2007

These "movers and the shakers," who had little ties to the community and were often located in Jackson were the decision-makers directing the recovery process. Interviewees repeatedly noted that the Coast was less politically conservative than the rest of the state and had different ideas for recovery for their communities.

> We do not have as much presence or as much, for lack of a better word, political clout, even though that's not really the right word, as the rest of the state. You know, the three coastal counties have always been treated a little bit different, even though the bulk of the tax base comes from either business, you know, from – mainly from businesses in the three coastal counties. The northern part of the state has always had more of a say-so in how the state as a whole is run.
>
> - Community development financial lender, White female, 2007

CBOs felt that the Coast had little voice to impact policy decisions that affected them because decision-making was concentrated into the hands of a few "movers and shakers".

According to interviewees, the most powerful of these "movers and shakers" was Governor Haley Barbour. Without fail, every interviewee in both studies indicated that Governor Barbour was the most powerful voice in recovery. In fact, one of the most common themes throughout the interviews was Governor Barbour's power (249 references across 19 interviews were generated for the overlap of "Power" and "Governor Barbour"). As former chair of the Republican Party, he had strong connections to

President Bush, the sitting president during Hurricane Katrina. Additionally, the president of the Senate Appropriations Committee at that time was Mississippi Republican senator, Thad Cochran. Therefore, Governor Barbour was well positioned to secure billions of federal funds for Mississippi. Notably, Barbour received $5.481 billion in Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds. CDBG funds are federal funds allocated by HUD for community projects and federal requirements stipulate that 70% of these funds go to projects that benefit low-to-moderate income individuals (Housing and Community Development Act, 1974). However, Governor Barbour received waivers on these stipulations so that he and his (self-appointed) recovery commission could distribute funds, however they wished with no federal or state oversight or requirements (Waivers, 2006; Weber, 2014; & Weber & Smith, 2013) Therefore, the governor had free reign to direct recovery money and, subsequently, the recovery process however he pleased. CBO leaders expressed awe of his ability to exercise his power so efficiently. As one legal aid coordinator put it:

> And our governor is very – he's used to throwing his weight around. That's how he became successful. He sends information very well. He does great PR, you know? I – we wish that we could learn how he does it so we could replicate it."
>
> -Advocacy CBO, Legal Aid Coordinator, White female, 2007

They were also appreciative of his ability to garner so much money for Mississippi recovery. In a way, his power was viewed as a double-edged sword.

In addition to appreciating his pull in Washington and his power at the state and national level, CBOs leaders were frustrated by the lack of accountability for the billions of recovery dollars flowing into Mississippi, as the following quote explained:

> And also another thing we realized in this disaster is that the federal government needs to have in – a governor should not have full responsibility for the spending of the money to say what he wants done with it. There needs to be oversight based on the

> needs that are there, and the communities need to be involved because they [the federal government] basically gave Haley Barbour, they just waived everything. They waived every rule, every EPA. Everything was waived, and, virtually your governor has free will to do everything and citizens have absolutely no input whatsoever… they need to give the legislature some kind of oversight so the governor just doesn't have full empiric [sic] powers.
>
> - Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2007

This unbridled power made tracking recovery money difficult and made it harder for CBOs to advocate for community interests in the recovery process. The same interviewee explained:

> Advocacy would be like, happens frequently, you send a letter to one of your congresspersons about something, and ask them to please change their position. And you get a letter back, "thank you for being on their side." It's almost like people don't count because they have money behind them to do whatever they want."
>
> - Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2013

Because CBOs and their constituents lacked money and power, they were unable to direct recovery in a way that benefited the community. Given Governor Barbour's power to get waivers on recovery funds coupled with the conservative state's "small government" mentality, ironically, the Governor and his commission were able to have free reign in allocating disaster funds without input from state legislators or community members. Unfortunately, as interviewees pointed out, these funds benefitted people who were already in power and not those people who were in the most need.

Governor Barbour and his appointed recovery commission drove the recovery process, which often reflected the interests of business and industry and not the communities in recovery. Many interviewees were adamant that they were not against economic development. In fact, they insisted economic development was important for a full recovery on the Coast. For instance, interviewees noted that the Mississippi is a "right-to-work" state and very "business friendly," attracting developers and certain types

of businesses, which they hoped would be positive for job and economic development on the Coast. However, leaders also pointed out that outsiders are hesitant to invest in a state that does not invest in public health and education. Additionally, they argued that too often, business interests and economic development projects trumped the needs and best interests of the community. When asked about the progress of recovery in 2007, one leader answered:

> So the answer to your question is that if what you're looking at is, you know, how quickly are we rebuilding this as a resort community, you might say we're doing pretty well. But if you're looking from the perspective of how are we doing at rebuilding communities and creating a place for people who have always lived along the Gulf Coast to recreate their homes and communities, I'd say we're not doing so well.
>
> – Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2007

Additionally, many CBO leaders questioned if these business-friendly policies were really in the best interest of economic development or job creation. Instead they felt these policies were actually schemes designed to put more money into the hands of business owners.

> People think Mississippi is "business-friendly." You know, that's sort of a mockable – business means – the real word there is they're saying, "business-owner-friendly." You're not a friendly business to the employee, you're basically – and no owner has any business that they don't have employees; so, it's a, you know, it's a symbiotic relationship, but they treat it likes it's not.
>
> -Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

CBOs felt that not only did business interests trump community interests but also business interests were not concerned with economic development on the Coast as much as they were concerned with generating corporate profits.

In addition to noting Mississippi's conservative political context and business-friendly economic context, interviewees also noted that Mississippi was an "insular culture". This inward focus was categorized by a distrust of outsiders and an insistence

on the state's independence, particularly from the federal government. While many interviewees noted that the Coast was much more open to outsiders and "new ideas," they explained that the majority of the state – particularly, the state government – was not. This mentality had implications for recovery funding and planning. For instance, this insular culture supported the "good 'ole boy" power dynamic that was difficult for CBOs to navigate as one leader described:

> It's still a very insular society. It's still run by frat guys that met at Ole Miss Law School, and belonged to the same fraternity and all that. There's pretty much still a very insular clubbiness to it all.
>
> -Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

This good 'ole boy network and mistrust of outsiders was reminiscent of state's rights rhetoric and, not surprisingly, impacted the ways in which the state government viewed and interacted with the federal government. CBOs noted that the state mistrusted the federal government and often opposed even beneficial legislation (e.g., accepting stimulus dollars). The following interviewee noted the irony in distancing the state from the federal government, while also accepting billions of federal dollars.

> Anything that the federal government might want that's positive, we're [state government] automatically against it. And that is everything. Even a republican insurance commissioner set up the health exchanges, and Bryant overwrote it. "We're not gonna have those." So, no matter which way you go, you have the same intransigence...[The Tea Partiers] are getting just what they wanted, and it's, the whole thing is growing just anti-establishment that the government has no role in anything, but I have to laugh at Mississippi more, over 70% of our money comes from the federal government [laughter].
>
> - Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2013

Interviewees explained that while the Coast did not express these views as strongly, the state government tightly controlled federal funds into the state (whether or not they were let in and where they were allocated) without considering the interests of the Coast, who felt like outsiders to the rest of the state.

Local level. The state political and economic context necessarily impacted the local context. For instance, the state's privileging of business interests over community played out at the local level. Many of the economic development projects not only took away money from other projects that could meet community needs, but they also directly harmed certain communities, particularly African American communities. Therefore, business interests were racialized as evident in the blatant disregard of East Biloxi and Moss Point (a predominantly African American town) in the recovery process.

> It's [the lack of recovery in Moss Point] unfortunate but I think [it's] because it is predominantly an African-American community. I'd like to be able to say that I don't think that had some influence, but I genuinely believe it did when it came to decisions with state government. When it came to, you know, "Do we put $15 million into a new baseball stadium in Biloxi or do we put $15 million into water and sewer systems in Moss Point?" Biloxi got the baseball stadium, got a baseball stadium.
>
> -Housing CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

Many interviewees saw this privileging of business interests as more insidious, feeling that economic development was a smokescreen for projects designed merely to benefit business elites, even seeing this trend with the local government.

> I think it's the worst thing in the world in terms of – it really created just – it makes me mad that our state government would take advantage of people who really need this money to make it possible for other people to get rich. This money – it's basically the same in most situations, it's nothing new. The government gives money for programs to help needy people. And the state and local government takes it and uses it to feed the pockets of the rich.
>
> - CBO Advocacy, Executive Director, African American male, 2007

Seeing business continually trump community interests became even more frustrating as the recovery process continued. Several interviewees noted that BP Restore Act monies were slated to go directly to the governor and that, once again, the state's goal was to spend the money on economic development and tourism, while the community wanted to

invest in restoring fisheries and wetlands. CBOs were "disheartened" to see this happen again, as one leader put it: "Same song. Second verse."

This frustration and disillusionment was amplified by the fact that CBOs had been voicing their concerns for years with no effect. In the beginning of the recovery process, the local governments involved CBO leaders and community members in public planning meetings designed to elicit community input into city planning. However, as STR transitioned to LTR, the interests of the community were consistently ignored:

> And I think that one of the things that was really, really, really frustrating for everybody, and you can really see it now, is that time and time and time again people were invited to come to some kind of a public meeting to give their input about what unmet recovery needs were or how the redevelopment of the coast needed to happen and the recommendations that had to do with affordable housing with, like, affordable childcare. All of these recommendations that were not related to this resort development agenda were just, you got tired of going to meetings where you said things over and over again, and they were over and over again ignored.
>
> -Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2007

This "illusion of voice" caused frustration and disillusionment with the government while also taking up valuable time. The same interviewee gave an assessment of this process 6 years later seeing it as part of a larger tradition of the general recovery process:

> And yet, I stand back and look at the kind of big picture of things, the Port, the recovery money, the [Business CBO funneling recovery dollars], I mean, all these things that happened, and I see a real layer of decisions that happened somewhere other than at the local community level. Because there was such a disconnect between the infinite number of occasions where people were asked to come and give input about recovery and what they needed and what they wanted and how they wanted it to look, dah, dah, dah, dah, dah, dah, dah, dah, dah. None of that ever happened. None of the recommendations were adopted. None of the advice was taken. None of the input guided what actually finally did happen. It was the same large hands of the money players that ultimately made what happened happen. And as I say, a lot of it was not done in a way that was transparent to people. And it is unfortunately a very common occurrence that the proceedings of a public hearing don't matter to the ultimate actions that are taken . . .
>
> -Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013

Perhaps because of this illusion of voice, many interviewees showed a distrust of government in general, a sentiment encapsulated by this volunteer advocate's assessment of the Coast's 2007 political/economic context: "A country that has forgotten, with a governor who doesn't give a shit, in the poorest state in the nation" (Advocacy CBO, Volunteer Advocate, White female, 2007).

Most CBO leaders explained the local context in a way that showed sophisticated recognition of the ways in which historical, geographical, political, and economic factors intersected to create a context that privileged certain groups over others – particularly along lines of race and class:

> Looking at these demographics and knowing your community – you know it when you've lived here all your life – you see that it has been pushed out the recovery process (our response to that disaster, not the natural disaster itself)…obviously, natural disaster coupled with social patterns created lots of issues. But if you look at our response of how we as a state and as a country, what we've done down here in South Mississippi is created an environment much more conducive for businesses and corporations to thrive right now without the vision of a community in mind, without the vision of neighborhoods, without the vision of who it is that is going to be employed by those businesses and corporations. By looking at what life would be like for those employees, as to where they would live, as to the quality of that housing, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera, they tend to be the ones that have, historically, belonged to protected classes.
>
> – CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2007

In other words, CBOs were aware that they worked within a context that consistently privileged the "protected classes" – the "movers and the shakers" – who held the wealth and made the decisions. Interviewees emphasized that these relations were not new but had existed for years and that those in power had erected structures to ensure that these power relations stayed in place. One of these structures or strategies was the illusion of voice:

> Whether you're talking about a nuclear power plant or a, a state public policy plan or a BP Restore Act strategy or a hurricane recovery strategy, you know, it's unfortunate that that is a dynamic that plays itself out over and over again. And the people who are in charge of the end game have gotten very good at making people feel like a public hearing process matters, and, and installing a pretty impermeable barrier between the public hearing process and what decisions finally get made.
>
> – Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013

These structures also ensured that powerful decision-makers were immune from censure and accountability.

> And basically, the political powers "to be" have always dictated what happens. In regards to how you cry out for these folks, politics still speaks louder than the needs of the people. And that's all this is, is politicking. Anybody else would have been thrown in jail if they misuse funds like they're doin' – like this governor's doin' here in the state of Mississippi.
>
> – Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African American male, 2007

Unfortunately, interviewees seemed to view these relations as more fixed than those at the national level. However, they continued to advocate for their communities nonetheless, finding creative and innovative ways to disrupt power structures.

Changes in Context

				Interview Coverage			
		Subthemes		# References		#Interviewees	
Eco-Level	Theme	A	B	2007	2013	2007	2013
Context	Historical			23	18	9	9
	Political/Economic			80	84	14	15
		National		19	39	10	13
			Political	10	33	7	13
			Economic	13	17	7	10
		State		36	35	11	11
		Local		21	27	10	8
			NIMBY-ism	5	0	3	0
	Geographical/Physical			3	12	2	5
Macrosystem	Racism			51	36	15	10
Context x Macrosystem	Historical context x racism			9	8	6	5
Context x CBO Level	National Pol/Eco Context x CBO Challenges			0	15	0	8

Table 5. Comparison of Interview Coverage for "Context" Codes from 2007/8 to 2013/4

Many of these contextual issues held over time; however, some changes in context were apparent, and these changes had implications for CBOs (See Table 6). The relevance of these challenges increased in 2013. When running a query looking at overlap between national political climate and CBO challenges, all of the 8 sources and 15 references were mentioned by 2013 interviewees. In fact, 44% of 2013 interviewees discussed national political climate and CBO challenges as overlapping. For example, while 2007 interviewees expressed more concern about the economic state of the country, 2013 interviewees placed more of an emphasis on the national political scene – particularly the rise of the Tea Party and the government shutdown – and the implications these politics had for the economy and the general attitude of the public. One reason for

this increase may be because the shutdown was ongoing while we were conducting interviews in 2013, and several CBOs were directly affected because they relied on federal funds. One interviewee spoke of a delay in an application for a federal loan. Perhaps most pervasive, however, was the notion that the shutdown was indicative of the larger national climate categorized by hostility toward social services and poor people:

> But part of the problem is not unique to the Coast. It really is a question that I think about in terms of the whole country right now. Just looking at the government shutdown and the sequestration cuts and the Paul Ryan budget, you know? I mean, this whole direction of people's behavior in public life recently seems to be moving in a direction increasingly without any indication that people have remembered how to be empathetic. I just feel like we have no capacity for empathy anymore… this mean-spirited, selfish, "me only," "only if it's gonna benefit me or mine"…I mean, it's really kind of . . . a challenge nationwide to what I was describing early on as Mississippi-specific. So, here we are, you know, relishing in our identity as a Christian nation, where this inability to be empathetic is also ruling our politics.
>
> - Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013

Interviewees also indicated that national politics was having real effects at the local level. For instance, the government shutdown and cutting social services had the most impact on those groups that were already disadvantaged. As the below interviewee pointed out, these national issues also affect CBO services by adding a new constituency that needed entirely new types of services.

> This national economic problem that we're having recently with the shutdown, government shutdowns of government programs, assistance, these furloughs – not only those in furloughs – are impacting the average income to where now it's putting them in a lower income bracket with not any services, but now these services that would usually be given to those that are economically challenged – now you got another economic challenged community, but now that these services are being shutdown, now where you are. You're making the poor poorer. You're making – government's making people starve. Well, you got – You're in a no-win situation with that. So again, economic situation around here is the biggest problem.
>
> - Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latino male, 2013

The sentiment at the national level was perceived as somewhat hostile to the very purposes that these CBOs were trying to accomplish, while also leading to funding cuts and shutdowns that were damaging for their mission and the people that they served, even adding additional people to their constituency.

In addition to shutdown and cuts to social services, interviewees were highly concerned with the effect that national policies had on their communities and organizations. Almost every interviewee mentioned insurance as the biggest challenge for the community going forward. During the 2013 interviews, Congress had just passed the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, which aimed to raise insurance rates in flood zones by 25% each year for five years until the rates reflected the full risk (2012). Many people on the Mississippi Gulf Coast were worried that they would not be able to afford flood insurance on their homes. Local housing CBOs were concerned that low-income clients in their housing programs would no longer be able to afford the insurance on their homes – particularly elderly residents on a fixed income. Of particular concern to everyone was the fact that residents could not prepare financially for these increases because they had no idea how much their rates could increase as the act removed all limits on rate increases.[5] The following CBO leader felt that the Biggert-Waters Act was a personal affront to Mississippi as she explained when asked about the biggest challenge for her community:

[5] In 2014, the act was amended to put caps on these insurance rates and to allow some "grandfathering," but at the time of the interviews, this amendment had not yet occurred. See congressional bill H.R. 2199.

> Everybody's going to tell you the same thing. It's flood insurance. You know, if they truly allow Mississippi to bear the burden of trying to make the national flood insurance whole until the other states have completed their remapping and rezoning, it's going to devastate the Gulf Coast area. It's [going] to desolate it. I mean, there's just no other way around it, and it's just going to have a huge economic [effects] that the area will never recover from.
>
> - Lender/Educational CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013

Therefore, certain policies like the Biggert-Waters Act added much more uncertainty to the LTR on the MSGC as well as led CBO leaders and MSGC residents to feel disregarded and even "used" by the federal government.

In addition to the uncertainty presented by the Biggert-Waters Act, one of the biggest changes politically for the Coast was the change in administrations – both at the national level and state level. Of course, changes in the presidential administration from a Republican administration to a Democratic administration had implications for the largely Republican state. As one interviewee put it: "they not gonna get that kind of money from the federal government again like they did after Katrina. That will never happen again. Because, you'll never have the relationship from a former Republican leader, which is Governor Barbour, talking to a former Republican president to get that kind of money or pull anything like that off" (Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African American male, 2013). CBO leaders felt that the MSGC had lost some of its power at the national level. At the state level, despite the frustrations with Governor Barbour's unrestricted power and business interests, the change in governors was not necessarily seen as a positive. By 2013/4, CBO leaders had learned how to navigate state power dynamics. With the new governor, Governor Phil Bryant, new power dynamics emerged that had to be learned. One CBO explained how he had learned to work with Barbour but was unsure of the ways in which power at the state level was currently operating:

> Governor Barbour I actually found to be, for as conservative a pillar as he was nationally, I also found him to be extremely pragmatic in that if you could provide him with evidence-based data that validated a need or a request, he didn't have a problem exercising personal or political capital if it was something that was verifiable and justifiable. I don't get that at all with the current administration…at all...And I think the power dynamics within the state politics, you know Governor Barbour, nobody was going to go up against Governor Barbour. He had his way on everything or whatever he said went. If you could get him to agree with you on something, nobody was going to oppose him or put up any real opposition, where that's not the case anymore. There are multiple factions of power that aren't necessarily in alignment with each other.
>
> - Housing CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

Another leader also emphasized the new governor's lack of power and the conflict within his administration, all of which led to an uncertainty of how to navigate these new power dynamics:

> We had such a strong governor in Haley Barbour. Master politician. Clearly got everything he wanted. The new governor, it's not as apparent yet. As a matter of fact, there's so much squabbling between the governor and the lieutenant governor and some of the others, it's sort of difficult to get your read on…Mississippi has always been a weak governor state.…Haley Barbour changed that. He got what he wanted…Whether other people will be able to use the power as he did, I don't know. But the lieutenant governor is the chair of the State Senate. So, if the governor and lieutenant governor aren't singing off the same sheet of music, the legislature can be more powerful. So, I don't know yet how that's going to play out.
>
> - CBO, Director of Initiatives, White female, 2013

New administrations meant new power dynamics to learn as well as meant a less powerful political presence in Washington.

Interviewees indicated that the rise of the Tea Party at the state level also had implications for CBOs. They described Tea Party leaders fighting to cut government funding to necessary social services that were often provided by CBOs. Tea Party officials also refused to work with CBO leaders to reach a compromise, making local advocacy difficult. In fact, sometimes Tea Party leaders worked directly against CBOs. For instance, the Tea Party movement in Mississippi attempted to thwart the efforts of one

of the largest new collaborations on the Gulf Coast that were working toward sustainable communities. Almost all CBO interviewees were a part of this collaborative and were working with local government agencies to produce better communities in terms of housing, transportation, jobs, education, and food access. One CBO leader explained the difficulty of working cross-sector with government when many of the government officials at the state and local level espoused Tea Party ideals:

> Governor Bryant himself at various points has either flirted with or openly embraced the Tea Party. One example is that he has aligned himself, or at least "liked" them on their Facebook page – the group which thinks that sustainable community planning, which is this effort by the federal government to reduce vehicle miles traveled and increase accessibility of homes to schools and to work, it's some kind of UN takeover of America via zoning. That sounds preposterous for me to say that to you, but that's literally what it is; it's called Anti-Agenda 21. So, you can go look up Agenda 21 in Mississippi on Facebook page, and Phil Bryant has "liked" it. And it's real. And it's crazy.

This interviewee continued to explain that the rise of the local Tea Party movement has also had impact on outside investors:

> And it's crippling Mississippi because nobody wants to invest in a state where the educational system is going to get crippled by people who don't believe in there being an important role for government in doing public education, or any of the other public services. It's really sort of the antitheses of civil government.
>
> - Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

Interviewees explained that this local Tea Party movement impacted CBOs by obstructing policies that would benefit CBOs, discouraging outside investors, and by directly campaigning against CBOs' efforts to work with government to benefit local communities.

Despite these challenges, many of the contextual changes at the local level were beneficial to CBOs. One of these changes included the community's increased openness to outsiders and new ideas. Increased contact with new people and ideas, as one

interviewee explained, disrupted this insular culture and led to an increase in advocacy and less mistrust toward outsiders:

> After Katrina, we had lots and lots of instances where people just simply stood up and said, "Yeah, I don't like the way this is being done." Lots more people were organized in lots of different ways. Sometimes it was aimed at the federal government because of FEMA terms; sometimes it was aimed at the state government because of misplaced priorities in using disaster money, and sometimes it was aimed at local government over issues of where poor people could live or whether they would have to elevate their homes or any of a number of other things…and the other thing that happened is with all these volunteers from all over the country, Mississippians were rubbing up against the shoulders of people who didn't think like that and had to be grateful for their support; so, they were having conversations with people who were politically out of the spectrum in which they operate. So, that was interesting. It changed and enriched our society, I believe. And that was powerful.
>
> –Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

Interviewees suggested that the community was even more tolerant of outsiders within their own communities. For example, an analysis of 2013/4 interviews showed a decrease in community members expressing "NIMBY-ism" – "Not in my backyard" – sentiments. In 2007/8 NIMBY-ism was an often-cited problem mentioned by almost every interviewee, and CBOs listed NIMBY-ism as one of the biggest challenges that they faced in moving forward in recovery. Additionally, NIMBY-ism did not show up as much in 2013 interviews. For example, one Housing CBO leader in 2007/8 discussed having to adapt their CBO public relations policy to address public concerns over building houses for poor people. Another interviewee lamented the loss of a much-needed elderly housing project. Despite the fact that the CBO had the money, the location, and the resources for the project, the community turned it down because they did not want "those kinds of people" in their neighborhood. The heartbreak of this leader is palpable as she explained the project:

> We got a piece of property, and we got a contract on it, and we had this beautiful plan that was done by volunteer architects. It was a beautiful layout. It was to be a

> senior village. And we had this and lo and behold, the citizens were against it. The citizens went online and they found out that [a national nonprofit affiliated with the CBO] served persons with AIDS, they served drug addicts, they served people getting out of jail…Well, we went to meeting after meeting and I finally got at the city counsel meeting with all these folks and I said, "I am [affiliated with the nonprofit], and yes, it is true, we do serve persons with AIDs…In fact, we do work with people coming out of prison and we have wonderful programs of restitution, and we help people get in transitional housing. That is a wonderful program we have. And, in fact, we work with people who have drug problems and rehabilitation." And I said, "And we actually work with the homeless even." I said, "But this is not what we're doing here. We're trying to get elders into homes." … But, of course, the whole program got turned down… they were worried about ruining the neighborhood, of course. The people [living on the lot] right now had an old Mardi Gras float that was disintegrating in their yard. So, you know, all of that was just they didn't want it, just didn't want this elder housing, so that was a real disappointment. It really broke our hearts because the elders need housing so badly.
>
> -Housing CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2007

However, NIMBY-ism was not mentioned at all in 2013/4, even when asked directly about housing. It is possible that this increased contact with outsiders led to a decrease in insular culture and also led to decrease in prejudice toward outsider within.

Another beneficial change included an increase in community organizing on the Gulf Coast. Interviewees in 2007 noted that it was difficult to organize at the grassroots level. However in 2013, almost all of the interviewees noted an increase in advocacy at the grassroots level. Analysis revealed that grassroots organizations were more prevalent and organized in 2013 and community involvement in general had increased.

> And, there has been a relatively anemic progressive protest for political base to challenge them. I think Katrina changed that. And, also along the way, [participating in community planning meetings] started to make people participate more frequently in challenging the wisdom of government decisions…And so, there's more and more skepticism about government, more government accountability demanded and more expectation about openness and transparency in the way government is conducted. I think that's, in some ways, accelerating some trends that were maybe, you know, in the beginning underway a little bit there. Uh, they've just been sharply accelerated, I think, by the storm.
>
> -Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

Sparked by increased civil engagement after the storm, community members continued to be involved in local government processes.

In addition to more openness to outsiders and increased advocacy, the Coast at the local level saw an increase in regional unification. For example, in 2007, the Coast was fragmented at both the government and CBO level. Leaders cited different and competing visions for the Coast as one of the areas of contention contributing to slow recovery.

> I think local jurisdictions need to come to the table; and they need to figure out what barriers they have put up as far as progress goes. I think that there's gonna have to be some pushing from the governor's office, maybe, to get them to act and to realize that the lack of making decisions and lack of being willing to cooperate and work together is causing more harm than good.
>
> -Lending/Education CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2007

Additionally, competition among and between organizations was cited as an issue:

> There was a lot of skepticism and fear from the board, their individual respective boards, and people in the communities think that there's a lot of – rightly or wrongly, there's a lot of competition and the people on the coast feel very competitive and slighted if one community gets more resources than the other.
>
> -Housing CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2007

However, by 2013, the Coast had really developed more of a unified vision as different municipalities were working together to plan for the future of the Coast:

> I think the interaction between the local government is good and part of this regional planning work has brought a lot of that together in terms of bringing mayors together. I think there has been some, and certainly what we're trying to work toward is getting more kind of regional kind of decision making with the creation of a Regional Tourist Counsel, as well as, you know there's other things that have happened. We worked a lot with the Regional Planning Commission, as well as the regional traffic and that's one of our partner's with the Sustainable Communities work. So, I think we're seeing more kind of regional cooperation, so I think locally things are getting better.
>
> -Housing CBO, Architect, White male, 2013

Additionally, cross-sector collaborations between government and CBOs and collaborations between CBOs were more common. Though interviewees did not

explicitly mention that collaborations had increased, the number of codes for collaborations increased from 41 references to 113. These groups worked together to plan for the future of the community, to reduce duplicating work and services, and to apply for funding for their initiatives.

> The Plan for Opportunity, which is what we call this sustainable communities work, is…in fact, the list of partners on that is a page long. I mean it's all these different advocacy groups, all these different…working with all the different cities. Anyway, we spend a whole lot of time in meetings, which is part of this work…and I think one of the things that we've gotten really well known for is our ability to kind of work well in collaboration. And it's something that I have come to really appreciate the kind of strain of partnerships and developing long-term partners. So, you're working with people…so, we have done projects repeatedly, you know, over and over again with some of the same organizations. We've just become sort of an extension of them in a sense.
>
> –Housing CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

CBOs found these collaborations to be beneficial. As 2013 interviews showed, almost universal recognition that collaborations were a useful way to enact change in the community. Overall, 2013 interviews showed a Coast in 2013 was less fragmented and less insular.

Finally, one of the major contributors to change in context on the Coast included the other disasters that had occurred in the interim. Almost all 2013 interviewees mentioned the impact of the combined effects of BP and the Great Recession on the Coast. Although interviewers asked questions about other hurricanes, like Isaac and Gustav, that had occurred, it was clear that the recession and the oil spill were perceived as the most impactful for the Coast's LTR. In some ways, the Oil Spill was positive for CBOs because they brought in additional money to help fund new projects and helped fledgling post-Katrina CBOs refine their mission. One leader explained how BP helped one post-Katrina CBO:

> The BP disaster, in some ways gave the organization another focus and again, it's too bad that you link it to disaster, but that's how it's played out I think. They've tried to identify themselves as an organizer of populations in vulnerable communities.
>
> -Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013

However, BP also had negative effects. It depressed the tourism and fishing industries as well as the housing market. Interviewees felt that the decrease in tourism and the housing market on the coast was influenced by the perception that all the beaches were covered in oil, despite the fact that the oil was not visible for long on the beaches. Of course, the oil spill made the most vulnerable groups even more vulnerable. The Vietnamese fishermen – an already low-income and marginalized group – were cited as the group most effected by the spill. While recognizing some of the benefits of the influx of new money, one interviewee was still hesitant to call it a silver lining for even CBOs because of its extreme negative effects and the possibility of the misuse of recovery funds:

> Well, yeah, I mean and it all depends on who is the beneficiary of the lining as to whether it's silver or whether it's black. And for a lot of people, they got knocked off their feet and they haven't been able to get back up. And that's in part, you know, if you were just getting it, getting up. We were just getting up and running when the recession hit. So, that double whammy has been, pretty profound and all this brew-ha-ha about the BP money and where is it going and who is it…when at the first meeting that they had about the BP money was [right] here. My boss stood up and said "Well, will you be expecting claims from [CBOs], will you be accepting claims? And he told her point blank "no". In a room full of 400 people, "no"! And they backtracked some on that, but those claims are still processing…some non-profits have gotten some bits and pieces of money but nothing that commiserate with the resources that the social services had to put in to helping the people impacted by the storm.
>
> - CBO, Director of Community Impact, 2013

Therefore, many interviewees expressed concerns over the opportunity for the misuse of Restore Act funds. Additionally, despite the fact that BP Restore Act funds brought in new money, this money was not always available to CBOs who had to expend more resources to respond to those affected by the spill.

Changes in Context 2007-2013		**CBO Effects**	
		Challenges	Benefits
Political/Economic			
National			
	Shutdown	Decrease Funding; perceived hostility	
	Biggert-Waters	Uncertainty for insurance rates	
	Rise in Tea Party	Perceived hostility	
	Rep. to Dem. President	MS less power to gain fed $	Administration friendlier to social services
State			
	Rise in Tea Party	Perceived hostility; opposing helpful federal legislation	
	Change in Governors	Difficulty navigating new power dynamics	Less unrestricted power than Governor Barbour
Local			
	Rise in Tea Party	Obstructing CBO projects and collaborations; perceived hostility; thwarted outside investors	
	Less insular		Community more tolerant of outsiders and new ideas; less NIMBYism
	Easier to organize at grassroots level		Increased organization and advocacy at grassroots level
	Regional Unification		Less CBO competition; more cross-sector and CBO collaborations
Additional Disasters			
	Great Recession	Decreased available public and private funds	
	BP	Increased vulnerability for marginalized groups; possibility for misuse of restore funds.	Increased $ to coast; delayed recession effects

Table 6. 2007-2013 Changes in Context & Implications for CBOs



Figure 8. Timeline of Events and CBO Changes

Ideology and Power

Eco-Level	Theme	Sub Theme	Interview Coverage # References	#Interviews
Power			155	30
Macrosystem	Ideology		47	20
		Meritocracy/American Dream	12	8
		Blank Slate	4	4

Table 7. Interview Coverage for "Power" and "Ideology" Codes

In addition to contextual influences, power and ideology impacted CBOs' work in LTR. Analysis showed that power was enacted throughout and within all levels and codes. In many ways it operated through ideologies that were promoted by those in power to explain inequalities – both preexisting inequalities and inequalities produced through the recovery process. Interviewees expressed an awareness of the ideologies that impacted their daily work and lives on the Gulf Coast. Most CBO leaders were critical of these ideologies, while other leaders attempted to use them to advantage their work. The ideologies that were mentioned most often included Bootstraps mentality or Meritocracy ideology and the ideology of the American Dream.

Meritocracy ideology and bootstraps mentality. Interviewees reported that bootstrap mentality was widespread among politicians and communities on the Coast. Bootstrap mentality is an extension of meritocracy ideology that explains social inequalities by tying success to talent and hard work. (Littler, 2013). MSGC "Bootstrappers" emphasized that people should "pull themselves up by their bootstraps" and not look to others for help. Both notions put the onus on the individual such that success or failure is solely the responsibility of the individual. In other words, if someone has not succeeded, it is their fault for not working hard enough or pulling themselves up

by their bootstraps. This ideology perpetuated, or perhaps enacted, a pervasive fear on the MSGC that people that giving people in need even a small amount of assistance would result in widespread fraud and government dependency. The state capitalized on this fear to explain why it directed almost the entirety of CDBG funds to economic development and homeowners and not to renters, elderly residents, or those on government assistance. They gave to those who had "earned" it by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps. This leader explained how this ideology operated in LTR:

> I'll tell someone that I do Katrina-related legal aid, and they'll say, "Oh, those people are just taking advantage of the government." And I'll quietly walk away…And they'll say, "Those people, they need to get out of those trailers and go to work. They need to pick themselves up by their bootstraps." And one of my elderly clients who is on SSI said, "[CBO leader], you know, my boots washed away." And I said, "Yes, Ma'am." I'm sure there are some people out there that are taking advantage, but the majority, the vast majority of people that are in need of assistance and receiving it, are hard-working parents of small children and elderly who were getting by before and are now really marginalized. And really, the disabled and the elderly are hard to house. And it's not their fault.
>
> - Advocacy CBO, Legal Aid Coordinator, White female, 2007

The client in this quote emphasized that having boots is a privilege not afforded to all people – a fact obscured by meritocracy ideology. This ideology made it possible for the government to direct funds away from those who most needed it, because it justified this move by arguing that needing help in the first place implies one does not deserve help.

This mentality affected CBO on the MSGC because in order to make progress they had to navigate these fears and perceptions. Many housing advocates and CBO leaders described having to be careful of the language they used, noting the taboo of even saying the words "affordable housing" instead of "workforce housing" as the former implied a handout. For instance, one housing CBO repeatedly had to defend itself asserting that its clients were "working poor".

> I think the big misconception about [the CBO's housing program] is that these aren't families that are coming off of Welfare or extreme poverty. In some cases, they do get assistance, federal assistance, but families that are buying our houses are – they are working poor. They're teachers aides, in some cases teachers, deputy sheriffs, they work in the service industry, they're nurses aides. These are families that all too often they aren't a lot of opportunities for them as far as housing solutions and more often than not the situation they're in, they'd never be able to afford or purchase their own home if it wasn't for [our agency] or other agencies working with them.
>
> –Housing CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

By asserting that clients were "working poor," this leader both buys-in to meritocracy ideology and tries to circumvent its effects that create a hierarchy of the working poor as more deserving than the non-working poor.

This bootstrap mentality was deeply embedded in Mississippi's identity and further perpetuated by Mississippi's sense of independence from the rest of the nation and the federal government. The dominant recovery narrative described Mississippi as pulling itself up by its bootstraps, not waiting on federal assistance as New Orleans had done. The following quote illustrated this narrative and this leader was careful to distinguish the MSGC from New Orleans:

> The people from New Orleans responded differently than the people on the Mississippi Coast. The day after, and part of it, too, was 'cause they stayed underwater, to give them that huge credit. But that morning after the storm, we were rebuilding. And we weren't whining to the national media saying, "Help us. Help us." We were rebuilding and as far as to recover, it's just to get back to normal. And that three-year report I gave you gives you some milestones or benchmarks, but that doesn't tell me necessarily that we're recovered. What tells me I'm recovered is that I could go eat a shrimp po' boy down the street and then go drink a beer at my friend's house and watch a football game like I did before the storm. That's recovery.
>
> - Business nonprofit, President, White male, 2007

Interestingly, this ideology persisted despite the fact that Mississippi received a disproportionate amount of recovery funds based on the amount of damage it received compared to Louisiana (Weber & Smith, 2013).

However, after multiple disasters this mentality was tempered a little. The MSGC continued to face many challenges despite the fact that they worked hard. For example, the following leader explained that the Biggert-Waters Act's impact on Mississippi was unfair and that the MSGC deserved better because they had worked hard.

> And that's why, when they were here from D.C….there was a gentleman in the audience that had a very good point. "We did what they asked us to do. We built back. We started working back in the community. We got the community back up and going. You told us we were going to be grandfathered in. We all kept our flood insurance intact, and nobody expected it to stay," as the gentleman said that day, "at these very, very low rates, but to try to use Mississippi after you asked them to be first and to do all this stuff as the backbone to making the National Flood Insurance Program whole isn't fair because we don't have any more or any less natural disasters than Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, and the East Coast." So, if that happens, there won't be a recovery for the area and, and not only will there not be a recovery, you know, there's going to be just a complete downturn in the economy, so...
>
> - Lender/Educational CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013

In other words, once privileged groups began to experiences challenges, the meritocracy ideology began to break down, leading to a cognitive dissonance that continues to play out.

American Dream. Another prevailing ideology related to meritocracy ideology and bootstrap mentality was the notion of the American Dream. Though the American Dream includes many types of values, in this case, the valorizing of the nuclear family and homeownership prevailed. Interviewees noted that one of the reasons some of the people fell through the cracks was because volunteers and state politicians subscribed to these values, only wanting to help those who fit into the American Dream. Those groups who did not fit this image were left out of programs and services. Often, these groups were those who needed assistance the most. The following interviewee described the frustration of securing help for renters and landlords:

> In fact if you – pretty much now if you drive down the kind of any neighborhood in Biloxi, and if you see a house that is sort of like is sitting there without much happening, it's probably a rental property, and so the people who own that property have not gotten any help. There was one – the state came up with a rental program – rental assistance, but it kinda came and went…most of these non-profit volunteer groups were not interested in helping landlords. And, in fact, this is something that's really interesting to me – one of the kind of values that these church groups bring is they put a high value on the individual rights of the homeowner to be back in their house. And so, to help, say, a landlord get a rental property back online is against that value because you're not helping the kind of "noble homeowner". You're actually helping a businessperson, which is understandable, but it really shows a certain kind of value placed on the kind of individual and their right to be made whole instead of stepping back and saying, "Okay, what's the overall housing needs?" We need rental housing. We should help a certain number of landlords so we have rental housing so we can have affordable places. But these volunteer groups, they're looking for – they're looking for the kind of touching story, you know.
>
> -Housing CBO, Architect, White male, 2013

Not only did this commitment to American Dream values disregard those people who needed help the most but it also created more work for CBOs and hardship for community members. By forcing these values on people, was more harmful than beneficial. A housing CBO leader explained the problem of forcing American Dream values on people:

> The only problem they're having now that I see is that the [private funders] who believed that everybody should get a free house wouldn't listen to us. I spent days and days and days and days with him trying to talk him [out of] this whole idea that if people lost a house they deserve a bigger house. I said, "But these folks didn't pay rent. The only thing they did on a house was pay utilities. They inherited it. They had very low costs. When you get this big house with three bedrooms, up in the air, with all these utilities and this fancy stuff, they can't pay for that." Well, he insisted…Well, now, those people can't live in those houses, and they're foreclosing on them. So, that's been a problem…You know, [Interviewer], not everybody's capable of being a homeowner.
>
> - Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2013

Blank Slate. Another pervasive ideology on the Gulf Coast was the idea that Hurricane Katrina created a blank slate. This ideology perpetuated the notion that Hurricane Katrina was the great equalizer that affected everyone equally, leaving a tabla

rasa from which to rebuild. However, most interviewees recognized that the Coast was, in fact, not a blank slate and that this rhetoric concealed the fact that both disaster and the subsequent recovery tended to worsen the situation for those who lacked access to resources prior to disaster (Klein, 2007). A few interviewees, who agreed with this notion, felt that the state had missed an opportunity to rebuild something better from the blank slate. However, most interviewees did not find this ideology useful because (as ideologies are wont to do) it hid the power dynamics and processes that had been at play for decades. The following interviewee explained the ways in which the blank slate rhetoric had been used in LTR and the ways in which it was "fallacious":

> But the competing visions come from those with something to gain from looking at what happened to this Gulf Coast in terms of a natural disaster, from looking at this area as a blank slate. The idea of the blank slate has been so prevalent throughout this process that that's what's allowed the new urbanist come in. That's what allowed Smartcode, that's what, you know, it's what's allowed for a vision of seeing Hurricane Katrina as an opportunity – I have no opinion either way – as an opportunity to create something different, hopefully better, while still maintaining aspects of the past. You know that's what we've heard. Maybe if you talk to you know someone on this that's what you hear…But it hasn't played out in reality exactly as it was, sort of, envisioned. The blank slate idea, first of all, is fallacious because we're not a blank slate…And while I think I agree that we could have used what happened as an opportunity to, perhaps, right injustices of the past, in terms of residential segregation, and in terms of a lot of different issues that Mississippi is just very, very well-known for...
>
> - CBO, Community Empowerment Specialist, White female, 2007

However, disaster does not create a blank slate from which to build; rather it writes itself onto the existing landscape, altering it in ways that benefit some and hurt others (Klein, 2007). Blank slate ideology begs the question: Who is it that gets erased? Or who or what is made blank? Not only does the blank slate ideology conceal the ways in which disaster and recovery have been inequitable, but it also allows for certain groups' struggles to be rendered invisible. Therefore, when CBOs educate government officials or the

community on the struggles of these individuals, these struggles appear surprising and unrelated to the history of systemic racism that undergirds their struggles. CBOs must work from the fact that marginalized groups' plights do not disappear just because they are rendered invisible by recovery efforts and ideological proclamations of a blank slate. CBO leaders emphasized the impact on their work with these groups – trying to raise awareness of these issues.

Analysis of contextual and ideological influences revealed that CBOs experienced challenges at multiple levels (see Table 8). In fact, the majority of challenges that CBO leaders discussed were not internal challenges but challenges stemming from the political and economic context within which they worked. CBOs developed strategies and took part in new roles in order to counter these challenges.

Levels	Challenges	CBO Effects
Historical Context	Perception of racism	Difficulty recruiting professionals and obtaining outside funding. Assumption of CBO racism.
	History of segregation	Discrimination in disaster effects and recovery processes.
Macro	Great Recession	Decrease in available public and private funds.
	Plantation Economy	Gave "white wealthy landowner" group a monopoly on power, wealth, and decision-making (often along racial and class lines).
	Rise of Tea Party	Cuts in government spending on social services and increase in general public hostility toward social services.
	Meritocracy/American Dream Ideology	Used to explain inequalities in disaster recovery; Kept $ from most needy by implying that needy people do not deserve help.Perpetuated values that privileged certain groups over others in recovery.
	Insular culture	Led to distrust of outsiders and outsiders within/NIMBY-ism
Exo	Government shutdown	Affected CBOs who received federal funds.
	Conservative small government +Gov. Barbour's power	No accountability for recovery $ spending.
	Gov/Bus elite privileged	Economic development over community.
	Biggert-Waters Insurance Act	Created uncertainty for homeowners, particularly low-income
	Changes in administration	Must learn to navigate new power dynamics.
Meso	Lack of CBO voice in decision-making	CBOs unable to direct recovery in a way that benefitted community.
	Illusion of voice	Distracted CBOs and wasted their time and resources.
	Business interests over community interests	Govt worked to put more money in the hands of corporations instead of community members.
	Distrust of government	Difficult to work with government entities.
Micro	Lack of unified vision among CBOs in STR	Distrust and competition among CBOs; duplication of services.
	Lack of grassroots leaders	Community members largely uneducated on recovery processes; no coordination.
Individual	Illusion of Voice	Staff stress & burnout.
	Staff cuts	
	Frustration & Disillusionment with government	

Table 8. CBO Challenges and Effects by Ecosystems Level

CBO Roles in Long-term Recovery

			Interview Coverage	
Eco-Level	**Theme**	**Sub-theme**	# References	#Interviews
CBO	CBO Roles*		326	29
		Funding Conduits	15	9
		Intermediary actors	76	24
		Advocates/grassroots organizers	24	13
		Government watchdogs	14	7
		Cross-sector collaborators	61	21
		Researchers	25	15

Table 9. Interview Coverage for "CBO Roles" Codes
*Aggregated references from sub-themes

Within this challenging political, economic and historical context, CBOs continued to serve and advocate for the communities in which they worked while also navigating their burgeoning roles in disaster recovery. While these roles were murky and nebulous in 2007/8, by 2013/4 these roles were more clearly defined. Additionally, interviews indicated that CBO leaders were more confident in their ability to carry out these roles. As the literature suggests, many CBOs found themselves serving as funding conduits, cross-sector collaborators and intermediary actors in the disaster recovery period. As recovery transitioned from STR to LTR, the number of CBOs discussing these roles increased. In particular, "Cross-Sector Collaboration" codes emerged more frequently in the 2013/4 interviews. Additionally, "Advocacy" surfaced as a "child node" under "Intermediary Actors," with almost all CBOs in 2013/4 involved in advocacy of some sort. An analysis of these 2013/4 interviews revealed additional CBO roles that emerged in LTR, including roles related to research, grassroots organizing, and acting as government watchdogs. These roles were often played simultaneously. CBOs balanced

these multiple roles by forming collaborations with other CBOs as well as across sectors. Collaborations allowed them to play different roles at different times. Notably, CBOs' work on the Coast did not always neatly fit into these categories as their work crossed boundaries and involved tasks that could be categorized in many different ways. However, for the sake of clarity, I present them here discretely, beginning with their roles related to funneling recovery funds.

Funding conduits. As the literature suggests, CBOs in this study sometimes functioned as funding conduits, funneling government or private money through their organizations to other organizations or targeted groups within the community. Most often, CBOs functioned as funding conduits as a result of their collaborations with other organizations. For example, if an organization did not have the capacity to manage large sums of money or did not have the qualifications necessary to receive these funds, partner CBOs would offer to act as a third party. One CBO leader discussed collaborating with a construction organization that was threatened by its inability to apply for grants. The CBO assisted by acting as a funding conduit for the construction CBO:

> And so, we really started partnering with other organizations that were actually doing the construction… they had that figured out; who needed it, how to get people there, how to match them up, how to house those volunteers, how to do all of that, how to manage the construction. They were not a 501(C)(3), however, and so, to access grant monies was impossible just about for them. And so, what we did was say, "Ok how can we assist with this?"
>
> – CBO, Director of Community Impact, White female, 2013

Not surprisingly, CBOs playing the role of funding conduits was associated with the increased number of partnerships among CBOs on the Gulf Coast. It also encouraged transparency and accountability of government entities and other CBOs. For example,

serving as a funding conduit served as a sort of checks and balances that allowed an objective third party to make sure monies were spent appropriately.

> We got money from USDA to give to [Healthcare CBO] to build a clinic in [nearby town]. So, it's like we do a lot of pass through. Somebody's got to do it. … You know trying, a lot of things have got to go through a third party. I guess that's what it is.
>
> - Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2013

Having CBOs available to function as funding conduits also helped secure more funds for the Gulf Coast by meeting outside funders' requirements.

Despite these benefits, most recovery money on the MSGC did not come through CBOs but rather was handled exclusively by the Governor's commission and funneled through business nonprofits that had been created for that sole purpose. Additionally, analysis of interviews revealed that only a handful of agencies were operating within this conduit role because this role required a certain amount of capacity that most CBOs lacked. Therefore, the CBOs on the MSGC acting in this role were longstanding, well established organizations that had experience handling large funds and were knowledgeable on how "the system" worked. In other words, the strongest organizations were participating in this role. This role, in turn, increased their capacity by giving that organization insider information on how funds were being spent on the Coast and by increasing their partnerships with other agencies. Notably, other CBOs also benefitted by partnering with these more established CBOs who had the capacity to handle large funds and manage grants. This role was not widespread among interviewees' organizations, however.

Intermediary actors. In addition to this funding role, CBOs on the MSGC also described taking on an intermediary actor role by communicating information across

multiple sectors. In these interviews, CBOs were involved in communicating important information "up" from the community to those in decision-making positions – particularly, lawmakers and politicians for the local or state government. They also were involved in disseminating dissemination "down" from policy-makers to the community. This role proved complex, as it required navigating political power dynamics on one hand and accessing hard-to-reach populations on the other. When communicating community concerns to policy-makers, CBO leaders often had to be strategic and creative. One interviewee, perceiving the political environment to be hostile towards his organization's constituents (immigrants), communicated community concerns creatively through a prayer service held at a congressman's office:

> We work very closely also with [another Advocacy CBO]. Just the other day I picked up Bishop from the diocese, and we had a brunch at the St. Peter at the Sea Episcopal Church. We co-sponsored this event to go to our congressman... We walked to his office and did a prayer there, a prayer service for his support for immigration reform. So, we did that with [the other Advocacy CBO].
>
> – Advocacy CBO, Branch Manager, Asian male, 2013

Another organization used a mutual education format to communicate concerns to lawmakers, simultaneously hoping to learn what was going on at the policy-level:

> We are hosting a forum in December to bring our Representative […] in to talk about what's – to give an update. He was just here on his September break, and we've asked him to come in December and speak to our Community Advisory Board group to give us an update right before the year-end as to what's going on, hoping that there'll be some progress made…we've been involved with other conversations about other people that are working on the issue and how we think it's going to impact our homeowners and really just giving feedback that they can hopefully take back to D.C.
>
> – Lending/Education CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013

In this example, the CBO set up an opportunity to communicate concerns to policy-makers and for the community to learn about processes at the policy-level that could affect community members. This strategy also encouraged politician accountability to

and interaction with the community. CBOs consistently used tactic such as these to more effectively communicate with both communities and policy-makers and to facilitate conversation between them.

In addition to communicating community concerns to policy-makers and government officials, CBOs also disseminated important information regarding government policies and practices to the community. Community members were not always aware of the policies or programs that affected them, nor did they know how to apply for these assistance programs if they knew of their existence in the first place. CBOs helped to fill that gap. One leader explained the important work of a coalition that worked with the Vietnamese fishermen community – an very insular, working class community that was severely affected by the oil spill:

> And the [Advocacy CBO], which is a long-term coalition. I don't even remember how long it's been, but there's a group that formed after the oil spill, which is basically to help the fishermen…. just to get information to the community in a timely manner, you know, dissect it, interpret it, and translate and documents, so, the fisher community understands what was going on. That was a real important void that they were filling.
>
> – Advocacy CBO, Branch Manager, Asian male, 2013

Therefore, communicating information to the community involved more than just disseminating information; it also meant ensuring that people understood the information and its implications for their recovery.

As the literature and the above quote show, CBOs were able to reach hard-to-reach populations that the government had not been able (or had not tried) to reach. State and local governments relied heavily on local CBOs in this study to outreach and educate these groups. They also used CBOs to translate government documents and interpret for government officials. Notably, this role proved difficult for CBOs. Not only was it

difficult to understand the policies and information they were disseminating but it also was difficult to get into these communities in the first place. Two interviewees were discussing a successful tax assistance program that they implemented with the deaf community and then paused to reflect on the difficulty of "getting into the community," which had less to do with bridging a language or cultural barrier and more to do with the time and effort it took to build relationships and gain trust:

> Interviewee 1: So, we had interpreters on hand but only if necessary. So, that's really nice; that's really good. And so, we're trying to expand that to some other underserved populations as far as access to getting free taxes done.
>
> Interviewee 2: But, you know, one thing that you mentioned, it also reminds me how hard it was even to get into that community in the beginning. And, you know, how, [we] wanted to do homeownership things too, but it was very difficult to get into the community.
> -Housing/Advocacy CBO, Executive Director and Community Organizer, White women, 2013

Analysis showed that just because CBOs were able to reach unreached populations, does not mean it was easy for them to do so. Even well established CBOs did not always have the resources to do the outreach that the government expected of them. This advocate explained the difficulty in outreaching and educating clients in applying for government programs:

> The problem is that for the Vietnamese, you can't refer [them] because they don't speak English; you have to go with them, and we don't have enough manpower to go with them. And you refer them, let's say, to DHS for food stamps. If DHS don't have anyone who speaks the language, you can't send people there to complete a form and do the interview. So, we have to have someone to go with them and that's where our issues come in because we cannot have our staff go from one point to the next. And again, it means that we just stretching. These are unfunded services that we do. But we can't turn people away. It's like Catch-22… You kind of always have that a struggle within yourself. I mean, if you don't do it, the community members won't get the services that they need. If you do provide a service, then you're stretching thin, and you're losing resources.
> - Advocacy CBO, Branch Manager, Asian male, 2013

To expect CBOs to fill this information and outreach gap without additional resources put undue burden on them that only the larger organizations were able to handle without significant strain.

Advocates and grassroots organizers. Although analysis showed that CBOs were acting as intermediary actors that conveyed important information across sectors – primarily, between the government and community – it also revealed that these roles were not always benign or apolitical. In fact, they often took on a more political character, such that conveying community concerns more resembled advocacy, and communicating information to the community became an opportunity for grassroots organizing. In fact, most CBOs in this study surfaced as advocacy organizations in 2013/4. Unlike in 2007/8, CBOs were not just informing policy-makers of community concerns but also pressuring them to make decisions in the best interests of the community. CBOs recognized that just communicating information was not enough to enact change:

> We go to various meetings to highlight some of the, the needs of community to the City Council, take them to state officials and things like that. But, but do we have an impact? I just don't see it at this point.
>
> – Advocacy CBO, Branch Manager, Asian male, 2013

In order to enact change, beginning in 2008, CBO leaders took on a more advocacy-driven role, a role that coalesced in to an organized coalition by 2013/4. The following CBO leader explained the goal of this collaboration:

> And our goal was to try to present a unified front on issues of fairness and equity and racial justice in the setting of the disaster response because it appeared to us that there was just a lot of what people called at the time "disaster capitalism" in the way, which is basically trying to figure out how to take advantage of people's sort of personal and political dislocation to produce some outcomes that we didn't like.
>
> - Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

Recognizing that advocacy was too hard to accomplish on their own, Coastal CBO leaders chose to collaborate in order to advocate for issues that were important to their community, namely affordable housing.

Even CBO leaders who were primarily service providing organizations were involved in the coalition, recognizing that it was difficult to provide services without taking an advocacy position. One leader described how he became involved in advocacy for Latino/a immigrants and their children:

> And what has happened in the past 5 years is their children now are school age. So, they're now coming into the school system. To where our services were needed as far as translating in the school and teaching them and advocating as well because we'll run into a lot of anti-immigrant sentiments. Those in the [school] district and other places were unlearned in regards to how the No Child Left behind Act would impact those that were undocumented, especially the children. And we had to educate them on those and then in some cases advocate to the point of threatening legal action or taking it to a higher posture within the district. And many of them willingly, seeing that the writing on the wall kinda backed off and in their words, "allowed" these children to have public education.
>
> - Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latino male, 2013

Therefore, many service-only organizations took on an advocacy role. This advocacy led to the education of both government and community sectors, as the previous interviewee continued explaining:

> And, and in that process of advocacy, we wound up doing outreach and education to those that were actually, for lack of better adjective, the violators. So, we had to educate them as well. And then that advocacy posture, we also outreached to our community to tell them these are basically the laws of the land here as well.

In tandem with this increase in advocacy in LTR, more grassroots organizing and collaborations among other CBOs emerged, turning information dissemination to community members into an opportunity for community organizing. For example, in 2007/8, CBOs began educating the community about certain government policies and

practices related to recovery. As a result, community members decided to form grassroots organizations in order to continue to educate themselves and to hold government accountable. In fact, the controversy over the diversion of CDBG housing funds to the Port of Gulfport actually helped spark grassroots organizing and serves as a good example of that process. It began when some CBO leaders researched the allocation of Port money, discovering that it was indeed diverted from a housing program. Then, one CBO posted this information for the community:

> Our [CBO] members went online and looked at the MDA site. They [MDA] didn't make it known that they were doin' that [diverting funds]. And after one of our [CBO] members exposed it, then that's when we put it out on the line, and people were made aware that it was happening.
>
> - Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African American male, 2007

Once they learned of this information, people at the grassroots level began questioning the information they received from the media and politicians on a regular basis and decided to form their own community educational programs asking important questions related to power:

> Well, many of those that are at the grassroots level, like we are in our organization…we're asking questions and we're not going over what the media says. We're not bein' blind – we're not bein' broadsided or blindsided by the media and the spin doctors and things of the media…So, there's the education piece and most people just be satisfied on what they see on the news on recovery. And a good example of that would be about a month after the storm – local media was pumping everything up as "on the road to recovery." "On the road to recovery." Yes, we are on the road to recovery, but everything they showed was the tourism industry… So we asked local organizers and grassroots activists and advocates have organized and do our own education piece and outreach to get to the communities that may not know actually what's goin' on.
>
> - Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African American female, 2007

This community investment in education itself led to increased consciousness-raising in the community and a persistence to be heard:

> So there's posture within the community unified saying, "Hey look, we do have a

> voice. Let's get together" to where they're starting to develop what they call a block campus – say "Hey, this is how we want our community, let's organize within our community and get our communities together so we can voice what we want."
>
> -Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latino male, 2007

Therefore, once CBOs educated the community, the community began to organize with grassroots leaders in response to the Port, which prepared it to address future issues of concern, like the allocation of the BP Restore Act funds.

By 2013/4, even more grassroots organizations had formed, and they were more organized and collaborative with other organizations. This increase in grassroots organizations was, in part, due to CBOs investing in educating and organizing the community and keeping effected community groups connected to each other. In fact, one CBO made it its mission to develop grassroots leaders:

> I believe it was in 2008 when the Board and the members changed the mission to development of grassroots leaders, building the capacity of grassroots leaders, and [this CBO] being the vehicle for doing that through leadership training and the community organizing to allow our member organizations in forming neighborhood organizations to lift up the issues that were important in their community. And [this CBO's] role was really to provide the backend support to make that happen.
>
> - Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latina female, 2013

One CBO leader emphasized the importance of developing grassroots leaders who would advocate for themselves and their community. However, he felt that this process was not quite complete:

> But, if you empower the group and gave them the power to know how to do that and to be able to function as a group, then they can go out, when these issues come up, they can go and tackle the folks and say, "Okay, well you're not going to do this, we're not going to vote for you next time. And we organized enough to get these votes out for somebody else." And when they hear that, they gonna have to change the whole picture. And how people support you and your issues, you know? So, politically, we have not gotten our folks stronger in the community to, to demand those kind of things.
>
> - Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African American male, 2013

While the Coast saw increased grassroots organizing, advocacy, community education, and consciousness-raising by 2013/4, CBO leaders agreed that there was still work to do to enact change on the Coast. Based on these interviews, MSGC CBOs seem well positioned to work with grassroots leaders to do so.

Government watchdogs. Increased community organizing and advocacy led to another new role for CBOs in LTR – that of government watchdog. Interviewees noted that holding the government accountable to ensure an equitable recovery took an enormous amount of time and resources, such that entire organizations and job positions were formed just to take on this task. For example, MSGC CBOs collaborated to form a new CBO entirely devoted to keeping track of government spending and to hold it accountable to the communities undergoing recovery. This CBO even proved more effective than the state legislature.

> At the same time the legislature in Mississippi tried to create an oversight committee to watch how this federal money was being spent and the legislation passed, but the Governor vetoed it. So there's been very little transparency in how that money has been spent. A lot of groups that are members of the [Advocacy CBO], in some moves since Katrina, have really tried to stay on that and really, I think, what they know is about all that is known about how that money has been spent.
>
> -Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2007

An interviewee from another CBO explained that his primary job was to understand government policies and hold the state government accountable:

> And I spent, really pretty much from that point forward, I spent my time trying to understand sort of the policy as it unfolded and how the organizations were responding and looking at the affordable housing issues mostly; to a lesser extent, looking at the fair housing issues. And trying to engage with the people at the Governor's office about the way that they were designing the housing program, which was very opaque. It was only one card folded over at a time, and no publically disclosed comprehensive plan about how the money would be allocated and distributed….
>
> -Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

Many CBOs and leaders devoted an enormous amount of their time and resources to following paper trails, understanding convoluted language and bureaucracy of government policies, and documenting these findings in a way that could be used to educate the public and put pressure on the government for more transparency and accountability.

> I think that the thing that you could say that we've done the most effectively is been a thorn in the side of the governor. And that's not that effective outside of just him being annoyed – he's gotten a lot of national press and he dogged at that. People here don't care really so it almost is useless in a way to do press in Mississippi cause people are like, "Governor's done a lot of good for us." So that's what I would say would be our primary accomplishment, and we've moved him in tiny, tiny little ways.
>
> -Advocacy CBO, Volunteer Advocate, White female, 2007

By being a "thorn in the side" of the government, by 2013, CBOs had been somewhat successful, even securing a $132 million dollar transfer in funds from the Port back into a housing program in 2010 (MDA, 2010; MCJ, 2016; Robertson, 2010).

Cross-sector collaborators. Despite inevitable tensions that emerged between CBOs and government officials as a result of playing the "government watchdog," CBOs were more than willing to work with government when the time came. In fact, cooperation with government and other sectors was very important to MSGC CBO leaders and, they believed, was key to their success:

> The reason that I think we are well-regarded at this point is because we were willing to call government to accountability, but when the occasion came, we were willing to meet with and work through on using data and using systems that we thought were objective and trustworthy – a solution to the problem. I think that's very important.
>
> -Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

Therefore, CBOs were very interested in cross-sector collaborations because they recognized that collaborations were key to finding solutions to community problems and

for CBO sustainability. The most successful and sustainable CBOs on the MSGC were those CBOs that were flexible and "willing to work with anyone." Not only did they collaborate with businesses, the community, and local and state governments, but they also collaborated with the federal government as one interviewee explained:

> And probably the biggest thing is that I actually was asked by the HUD secretary to serve on a task force this past year with him and nine other people on second-term housing policy as it related to White House housing policy as it related to disaster. So, yeah. It's kinda crazy.
>
> -Housing CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

This same interviewee expressed the importance of collaborating across sectors when asked if his organization was a model for others in similar circumstances:

> Yeah. I think so. You know, both in on our approach to the services and the needs within the community, but then also the creativity there at the ground level, but then also in our approach – and this is probably more so – our approach and creativity in how to engage governmental entities. Really the basic philosophy is that we've got to make it easier for them to say "yes" than it is to say "no." Anything creative and innovative, their default answer is going to be "no" because it's not familiar. [laughs]. And so, you know, we've found a lot of… yeah, we've found a lot of creative ways to get things done.

CBOs learned to be strategic in their collaborations, especially those with government entities.

Cross-sector collaborations often put CBOs in the role of trainer for other sectors. In the 2013/4 interviews, CBOs discussed training government officials and sometimes other CBOs in different issues related to capacity-building, cultural sensitivity, and working with the community more generally. CBOs working with immigrant communities were particularly likely to be involved in educating the community and government officials on cultural sensitivity. Often they became involved with the government initially because officials needed translators and interpreters. The following

leader explained how they began training city employees, first establishing a relationship by helping translate documents, which led to training government officials on cultural differences and sensitivity:

> Interviewee 1: So, we have to be very careful in terms of how to –
>
> Interviewee 2: Approach the people. Yeah. But the city, too, they do a pretty good job. We work with the city also on reaching out to the community. They have it [disaster kit] in Vietnamese and Spanish. Although, remember the Vietnamese language was terrible that day?
>
> [laughter].
>
> Interviewee 1: Right. Yeah, they used a Google translator…I mean, because the problem is that they don't have anyone speaking the language working for the City, so they assumed, "Hey, it looks like Spanish; so, alright, it's Spanish." So, but when we look at it and say, "What the hell are you saying? It doesn't say anything at all," and then they say, "Ok well, you tell me." Because that is wrong information you send out. They tried to let me know how "we had this translated in different languages." But those languages were not accurate.
>
> Interviewer: Sounds like there's still a lot of work to do to educate other organizations and the government about reach hard-to-reach [groups].
>
> Interviewee 1: Oh yeah. Especially the city…They had the good intentions. But then again, the result is not worth it.
> - Advocacy CBOs, Branch Manager/Program Director, Asian male/Mixed race female, 2013

In this exchange, it is clear that the city not only expected these CBOs to do outreach for them, but it also expected them to translate the disseminated information. These CBOs took advantage of this situation and used it as an opportunity to educate the city on Vietnamese and Hispanic cultures:

> Interviewee 2. You know, it's a job, truly, he can tell you that. I mean, to inform your community, to inform people who are in the court system, to inform them about different cultural behaviors of the Vietnamese… you had to really educate the American people: the nurses and the school teachers, stuff like that. So, like I said, it is an ongoing process because you have to know sometimes why people behave a certain way, you know? Especially in the courts.

> Interviewee 1: Yeah, as well as it's different cultural values so, you have to understand the culture and values effectively…So, those kind of things that we have to train as culture competency. You have to understand the culture to serve effectively the populations.
> - Advocacy CBOs, Branch Manager/Program Director, Asian male/Mixed race female, 2013

These cross-sector trainings were sometimes informal, occurring through daily interactions, and sometimes they were more formal taking on the form of seminars. Even CBOs who were not involved with immigrant groups provided training on community work. Regardless of the form of these collaborations, cross-sector collaborations led to increased CBO access to people in positions of power, which increased CBO capacity to enact change and "get things done" on the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

Researchers. My analysis revealed an additional role that undergirded all the other roles and that is largely absent from the literature – that of community researcher. In addition to their service provision, advocacy, and recovery roles, CBOs on the MSGC worked as researchers or investigators in their community. Of course, CBOs must always be on the lookout for the newest best practices in order to remain useful to their communities; therefore, they devoted time to research evidence-based practices best suited for their clients. Additionally, many CBO leaders were expected to conduct needs assessment before implementing programs as well as to conduct program evaluations to provide feedback to funders. Notably, interviewees emphasized that program evaluations were difficult to conduct when undergoing LTR, in part, because of the many roles they played. The following quote explained the difficulty of conducting program evaluations:

> I think the other challenge that we have…is evaluation of our work because it's a collaborative effort…And I was saying that I needed help with creating a process evaluation for the – doing around our young males of color, and they're bringing in people to help us… and I think that's one of the things that is a challenge and that we have to continue to work on is yeah…we could say we were successful,

> but not a formal evaluation. And I think that's one of the things I want to see us grow in is to methodically when anything we're launching, not only putting out the goals, the objectives, the strategies, the activities, but then we're also at the outset saying "And how will we know that we were successful, and what kind of evaluation will we do at the end of the day?" So, I think that's very important. To continue to assess…and evaluate the work that we complete.
>
> -Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latina female, 2013

This leader indicated that evaluations with collaborations were especially difficult. Interestingly, CBOs also explained that collaborations helped them build capacity needed to do program evaluations in the first place.

In addition to researching program effects, CBOs in this study also researched government policies and investigated recovery funds, which was difficult because the convoluted and political terrain they must navigate complicated tracking government spending. In other words, playing the government watchdog role necessitated constant research into political processes. This research was further complicated by the political "spin" and government bureaucracy through which they must sort. As shown above, entire job positions and CBOs were devoted to researching government policies and funding allocations. Another way in which CBO leaders acted as researchers was by providing the government and other sectors with results from community needs assessments. They even expected CBOs to provide them with important community data, as the below quote showed:

> Now, there's no official census going on because Latinos – whether they're documented or undocumented – few will submit a census. And the census going on here locally are based on a 2000 census. So, they called our organization and asked us for numbers and again, we didn't go physically out there and calculate. We can just easily say – because we saw the numbers increase to multiple usage and fortunately, the Wal-Mart was one of our places, you know you walk in – probably three out of five people walking in the Wal-Mart are Latino. And, of course, there were quite a bit of contractors callin' me – businesses were calling me – wanted Latino workers. And I'm not a employment agency, but yet they were callin' me because I'm in the Latino community and everyone was givin'

> them my number sayin', "He's the one you gotta go to and talk to. He's the one that basically knows just about anything and everything about the community."
>
> -Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latino male, 2007

In addition to his other duties, this advocate was expected to have community-level data despite his lacking research skills and resources to conduct such research. Ultimately, in order to take part in any other roles and to be sustainable, CBOs must engage in some form of research. The most successful CBOs were the ones who were continually researching new best practices, able to provide evidence for program success, able to provide needs assessment data, and willing to try new things. As previously shown, these tasks were difficult to complete when understaffed and without funding or appropriate skills.

As shown, CBOs' roles in LTR were difficult and complex, and MSGC CBOs recognized early on that they must team up in order to fill these roles. Collaborations allowed CBO to match skills, such as grant writing, funds management, and research skills with needs. All of the CBOs interviewed valued collaborations with other CBOs and community members. In fact, one CBO explained that its role in the community was making sure that the community leaders across sectors were at the decision-making table:

> There's a lot of, and I would say maybe even on our part, skepticism that grassroots organizations, local people, are gonna be left out of the process to plan and propose projects around restoration, and so, I see [this CBO's] role, for example, in being able to convene all of those different groups to be able to say "what is our plan to make sure that – not [this CBO's plan] but the plan of all of the partnering organizations that have an investment – in insuring that they have a seat at the planning table, that their community members have a seat at the planning table. So, that kind of convening: making sure that we're all coming together and that we're working together to make sure that all of the different organizations and individual community members, that we have a strategy to make sure we're at the planning table.
>
> -Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latina female, 2013

These roles proved essential to fighting for equitable recovery on the MSGC and for achieving sustainability for CBOs facing a challenging political and economic climate. CBOs on the MSGC recognized this benefit and by 2013, had developed strong collaborations in which CBOs and community members, freely sharing resources, skills, and information.

Long-term Recovery and Funding Challenges

Much of the impact of LTR on CBOs (and CBOs' impact on it) has been discussed in connection with contextual influences and the many roles that CBOs played in LTR. However, given the pervasiveness of funding challenges for CBOs in LTR, this topic merits additional attention. Therefore, the following section presents key challenges related to funding and the ways in which CBOs on the MSGC responded to those challenges. Not surprisingly, the most common challenge mentioned by interviewees in 2013/4 was funding. Arguably, funding is always a concern for nonprofits, but these interviewees noted that the particular LTR context exacerbated typical funding problems. Whereas money was flowing into the Coast during STR, by LTR, national attention and funds had moved elsewhere. Additionally, the recession compounded the funding problem by severely limiting the amount of funds available from both private and government sources. The government shutdown and cuts in funds for social services also had a tremendous impact at the local level. Despite all of their success, even the strongest CBOs were uncertain of their long-term sustainability.

> I mean the funding squeeze is just, I'm, you know, it's hard to stay effective when your funding is cut and cut and cut. And I think the backbone organizations have been flexible, have been adaptive, have been through bad times before. What's different now is none of us see a light, we don't see what the light is at the end of the tunnel. Obviously, the local community cannot make up for the losses in government funding. And when I meet with my peers, we're all shaking our heads

> and saying fast forward is not clear, and we all are keenly aware of the cliff that it wouldn't take much to push us over. So, even though the services are going on – there's no sense of certainty that we'll be able to continue to do this.
>
> -CBO, Director of Community Impact, White female, 2013

Most CBO leaders directly linked funding challenges to national political and economic climate. As mentioned previously, the rise of the Tea Party locally and nationally was perceived to present both direct and indirect challenges. The following interviewee who worked for a Catholic CBO felt that the tone of the national political context was growing increasingly hostile toward CBOs. She described the indirect and direct effects of that tone in the following quote about the defunding of a national organization that supported her CBO:

> …there's all this fundamentalism that's going on, how they've just attacked Campaign for Human Development terribly. They've really attacked it and gotten the bishops to look at who they're [CHD] affiliated with, and if they're affiliated with any kind of group that's questionable, maybe Planned Parenthood or any gay organization, anything, they make them take the funding away. And the right wing of the church along with Boehner's groups and all that have put this pressure on the bishops to stop the Campaign for Human Development…and the Campaign for Human Development is very ecumenically – it really provides funds for community organization in poor communities…And so they're going after organizations that are known for working with poor people and helping people to become empowered to their own voices. So, you know, in Mississippi, it's always been that way – it's nothing new. But for something to go at that level of the Campaign for Human Development, that's big business.
>
> - Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2013

This national context, while having direct effects on CBOs' funds, was perceived as hostile to CBO leaders, increasing their uncertainty in their organizations' futures.

This funding issue had various effects on CBOs' operations – from service provision and advocacy to staff burnout and cuts. However, lack of funding also hindered organizations' capacity to look for other funds. After staff cuts, one executive director

described trying to balance many jobs, which in turn affected her ability to spend time garnering more funds:

> We are non-profit. And as executive director it's really my job to reach out to funders and generate the funding that we need for the work that we're doing. And because we're short-staffed, I have been spending a lot of my time doing programmatic work. I just recently hired someone to help me with grant writing and grant management…so, I feel like we're going to be more successful this year. I hope we are. Because I've been so involved in the day-to-day programmatic work, and that was just because of not having all the staff we need. But I think that's one of my biggest challenges for the organization is we've not created enough funding to be assured that we don't have to worry about every year "are we going to have enough money, you know, to cover our budget?" So, funding issues are one of the biggest issues for [this organization].
>
> - Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latina female, 2013

Many groups expressed lacking the capacity to garner funds that would, in turn, increase their capacity. This vicious cycle was a concern for almost all CBOs, even the strongest organizations.

The most successful CBOs were those that were able to hire grant writers to go after funds and manage grants, as the above interviewee was able to do. However, not all CBOs were able to do so, and grant writing had to be completed by staff, without skills in writing or managing grants, whose main jobs were service provision.

> And when I think about myself doing a proposal for funding for the the inner children, for tutoring, mentoring girls. Why are we denied every time? Why are we denied affordable childcare, in-home childcare, women are getting their education to keep children at home? Why are we denied? Because we don't know how to put this professional grant in place? But the person that has professional writing skills to put it in package get the funding, but they're not doing the work.
>
> - CBO, Executive Director, African American female, 2013

This CBO leader explained the frustration of failing to secure funding for work she was already doing in the community, while other people who were not as involved in the community were able to secure that funding because they were skilled in grant writing.

The above interviewee also raised an important issue that resonated with other leaders – the blessing and curse of working with external funders. In order to address issues with funding, MSGC CBOs realized the need to diversify funds and transition from relying on federal funds to a mixture of external national foundations and local private funds. The most successful organizations were those that were able to maintain long-term partnerships with external foundations to sustain funding streams.

> One of the things that happened during the recovery period was, of course, there were tons of generous people from all over the country who were interested in supporting recovery efforts and there were foundations interested in directing their charitable giving toward recovery efforts. And so we benefited from some new foundation partnerships during that period that we've been able to parlay into ongoing funding support, especially for [one of our programs]. And that's been really helpful.
>
> - Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013

While external funding was necessary to CBO success and sustainability, it also presented issues. For example, external funders were often unfamiliar with the local setting and entered with their own agenda, assumptions, and requirements. These requirements for funds did not always fit local needs.

> Well, like I tell you, go back to the money. You know, the money we have, the money has dried up. We, you know – the other ones that are giving money, they're specifically giving it for the things they were designed originally to do it for. Like, [National Funding Foundation]. [This foundation] normally gives money for children's education, child development, and stuff like that. Uh, and so they not going to give you any money. So, you have to fit whatever they have set up to get funding, whereas before, those monies were kind of like administrative-type monies, you know, money you could use to hire people to do stuff with, and it didn't have as long as it was for Katrina relief – you know, you could do it, but now that's not true. Katrina days are over, you know. That money has dried up.
>
> –Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African American male, 2013

This executive director explained that operational funds that were available after Hurricane Katrina were no longer available. Instead funders wanted to implement their pet projects locally.

While recent disasters, like the oil spill, brought new recovery money to the Coast, this funding was not always available to CBOs, again, because funders misunderstood community needs.

> Interviewee: I mean in a nonprofit agency and a social service agencies, funding is always a challenge to meet the need of the people that are requesting assistance. When the BP oil spill happened, people was coming to [our CBO] when they lost their jobs. They wasn't going to BP saying, you know, "I need rental assistance" or "I need utility assistance" or "I need food." They was coming to [our CBO]. So, you know, funding opportunities is always a challenge in trying to meet the needs of the community.
>
> Interviewer: Did BP put any funds in here?
>
> Interviewee: Like, three years later… it probably was two years after the fact that they actually gave us some funding. It was about 40,000 dollars…We didn't receive a dime when the need was the greatest, you know.
>
> -CBO, Executive Director, African American male, 2013

Because Restore Act funders did not consider that community needs might involve helping CBOs who were serving all those groups affected by the oil spill, they were not offered funds initially.

External funders, while necessary to capacity building for local CBOs, could also add to their stress by unchecked assumptions and arbitrary requirements that made collaborations difficult. As previously discussed, MSGC CBOs collaborated with each other in order to build capacity and to be more competitive for funding. In fact, many external funding organizations required CBOs to collaborate in order to receive funds. Unfortunately, funders also made it difficult to collaborate while requiring that CBOs collaborate in order to receive funding.

> I think in many ways funders are part of the barriers to collaboration because the reporting they want or the, all of that does not jive with what others want to do. And then, of course, the cut back in funding, you know, part of you says well if there's, you know, we will work together more cooperatively and that way we can share resources but it really turns out when I look at collaboration, it doesn't save money. It increases impact and capacity. But it, it's not about saving money.
>
> -CBO, Director of Community Impact, White female, 2013

This leader recognized that collaborations were not about saving money and that they were often more difficult because of arbitrary requirements from funders.

Additionally, external funders sometimes held offensive assumptions about the local leaders and tried to influence them to make decisions in line with the foundation's interests instead of with the community's interests. However, CBOs leaders had grown savvy by 2013/4. They knew how the system worked. They had experience with foundations and with working in collaborations. They supported each other in navigating these issues with external funders. One interviewee explained that she had learned to play the game:

> But I think one of the interesting things about [Large National Funding Organization] – and we all, we all snipe at this – they really think we're a bunch of idiots. "You know, those people in the South aren't too smart. We really have to guide them." Like we don't know we're being guided…. I mean, even in the [organization]: "Oh, keep talking. I love the way you sound"… And, of course, when somebody says that, I just lay it on like you wouldn't believe. And I talk just like the Delta. I can do it so well. I can make any word be two or three syllables if you want me to. We've gotten over that now 'cause I've outsmarted the girls a couple times. I said, "I might talk slow, but I think fast. So watch out."
>
> - Housing & Advocacy, female, 2013

Learning to "play the game" was one of the major strengths that CBOs demonstrated in LTR. It helped them navigate difficult political terrain, external funders, and the competing roles that demanded their time and resources.

CBO Strengths

			Interview Coverage	
Eco-Level	**Theme**	**Sub-theme**	# References	#Interviews
CBO	CBO Strengths		60	16
		Advocacy	4	3
		Mission (flexible, outside of disaster)	12	6
		Collaborations	26	10

Table 10. Interview Coverage for "CBO Strengths" Codes

I conclude this analysis with a brief summary of some of the CBO strengths that emerged in LTR. As mentioned above, learning to "play the game" or to navigate complex power dynamics was one of the biggest strengths displayed by these CBO leaders. Leaders learned to capitalize on the ideologies, outsider assumptions, and business interests by using them to their advantage. For example, the CBO leader above learned to use outsiders' assumptions that slow speech was tied to small intellect in order to catch people off guard and to find out important information. As she said, "I might talk slow, but I think fast. So, watch out!" When playing the game did not work, CBOs exhibited other strengths, such as advocacy, adapting their mission, and forming collaborations to enact change on the Coast and to ensure their sustainability.

Advocacy. Those CBOs who were successful were those who added themselves an advocacy component to their organizations' mission or who were involved in advocacy collaborations. Even those CBOs who were hesitant to label themselves as advocates, recognized that community problems were multi-leveled and knew that they would have to move beyond service provision to enact higher order change. Many of the leaders were also involved in national initiatives. The following CBO was one of the few

that did not include advocacy as part of its mission, but even this CBO recognized the strategic importance of advocacy:

> Our board made its first, took its first advocacy position last year. That's, that had been an area that they were, no, we're not going there. And there were some legislation that to look at early education, preschool and mandatory kindergarten and our board stepped out and took a position on that. As part of our strategic plan, we've recognized that advocacy is, we need to develop that capacity…And so that's hard to know how to do.
>
> – CBO, Director of Community Impact, White female, 2013

This analysis showed that successful organizations included service and advocacy, which involved working with grassroots leaders. One leader summarized this finding succinctly:

> And this is what I've failed to really push on is that one of the biggest difficulties in our work with poor people and communities is that we've separated the advocacy, the direct services, and the community organizing. It needs to be a three-legged stool. And until these three groups begin to understand that they're all working together with the same purpose, but have different focus and can work with each other, no one of these groups can work without the other to make any successful change.
>
> - Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013

In LTR, service provision was incomplete without community organizing and advocacy. These characteristics made for a strong, sustainable CBO in LTR.

Mission outside of disaster. Another strategy that CBOs on the MSGC employed that added to their strength was striking a balance between sticking to their pre-disaster missions and remaining flexible to changing needs and contexts. For example, although many disaster-related needs still existed in LTR, interviewees noted that maintaining a disaster-related mission was difficult in LTR in part because funders were no longer interested in the area and had moved on to other disasters. The following interviewee described a CBO that really prospered in STR but struggled after recovery money dried up:

> And they were a loose-knit group that didn't even really call themselves into being until a disaster occurred. And then after Katrina, they have continued to try to exist as a functioning organization with a staff person, which was never true

> before Katrina. And so that's a new chapter in that organization's history. So I don't know, I think obviously the ingredients are mission and funding. And the mission has to be one of integrity and [that] resonates with people and be demonstrated in the life and work of the organization... Because a mission this far out that's still connected to recovery is on thin ice…there's still consequences that people are facing that are connected to Katrina, but being a recovery organization in 2013 is hard to do. So, people who were that have had to find new identities.
> – Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013

Having a mission that included but also expanded upon recovery was essential. Additionally, CBOs must have a mission based upon community needs and concerns. They must be flexible enough to respond to a changing context without changing the overall goal of the organization.

Finally, one of the biggest strengths of CBOs on the MSGC was their ability to form collaborations – both with other CBOs and across sectors. In 2007/8, CBO division was still an issue, but collaboratives were increasing; by 2013/4 CBOs showed a particular adeptness at working together.

> As of right now, here in East Biloxi, we have a group of probably about 20 to 24 maybe different entities in the community…And so, we meet on a monthly basis. It's called the [Community Collaborative]. And we have been meeting, I know, consistently for over the past year. And so, we are fledgling along with trying to really gain the trust and the input, and we've got some subcommittees that meet around health, civic engagement, education, economic security, and different things. And so, I'm really, really excited about this. This came as a result of, you know, the things that happened with Katrina: the desire to build the network and linking the pieces together. We have a lot of work to do. But I am optimistic that we're going to be able to really cement this collaborative for the betterment of this community.
>
> -Healthcare CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013

CBOs not only engaged in collaborations, they were also excited about them, were actively seeking them out, and were good at them.

In addition to CBO collaborations, CBOs had begun to reach out to government and business sectors in an effort to increase their capacity and their connections to people

in power in order to enact macro-level change.

> I have been saying to my staff that a measure of our success is creating unlikely allies. And that could be with the business community, and it could be with the governor's office…I have to challenge myself personally to reach out to people who I maybe have seen as my adversary to extend the hand of partnership and wanting to work together where we can. Sometimes we can't work together on certain things… The other thing is, where we can, is to build partnerships with businesses, and help businesses better understand what our work is as, as a nonprofit…And it's this whole thing about yes, you know, we want to build partnerships and collaborations, and the first thing that comes to my mind is "Oh! What nonprofits are going to be involved?" What doesn't come to mind immediately is "What businesses are going to be involved?" And, and is there a role for state government and/or the Federal government in this? But that's the kind of thinking that needs to happen…I don't know that it'll change the power dynamics, but I think it's certainly going to make us more successful in the initiatives that we are launching and trying to get addressed…I know that I have a certain view of maybe a business. I have a certain view of government. And they, in turn, have a certain view of nonprofits and our work. And the only way that we can begin to break down maybe stereotypes or fears about the other is to, is to begin to talk about how we can work together on particular initiatives and to reach out to each other. And that's what we gotta do.
>
> - Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latina female, 2013

CBOs used cross-sector collaborations to gain access to power in the decision-making process and also used them to break down barriers and dispel myths and stereotypes. These types of collaborations required patience, creativity, and humility.

Chapter 7. Discussion

Conceiving of CBOs in a disaster context as entities affected by and affecting multiple ecological levels was helpful in locating LTR challenges and CBO strengths. In fact, many of the interviewees seemed to view things quite ecologically. Because a disaster impacts all levels and changes the system, understanding it in this more comprehensive way was more useful than conceiving of it as merely an event from which to recover. Disaster sets into motion a change to the system that can harm and/or help the other systems, entities, communities, and individuals in it. This framework was useful in organizing my codes, guiding my analysis, and presenting my results. Please see Figure 4 below. Future research on CBOs in disaster contexts might benefit from using this ecological framework.



Figure 4: CBO Disaster Ecological Systems Model of LTR Challenges

Results from this study indicated that contextual factors at macrosystem and exosystem levels have implications for CBOs operating in LTR. While studies often

assume that CBOs are affected primarily at the local level, this study revealed that CBOs were impacted by national and state political and economic contexts in addition to the local context. In fact, the national political context became even more relevant in LTR for CBOs on the MSGC, particularly, with the rise of the Tea Party and the cutting of social service funding. Interestingly, findings showed that multiple disasters, like the oil spill and Hurricanes Isaac and Gustav, were not as significant for CBO operation in LTR as were the influence of the state and national political contexts. Additionally, this study showed that issues related to history, racism, power, ideology, and the geographical context presented certain challenges to CBOs operating in LTR.

This study found that in spite of these challenges, CBOs in LTR were continuing their STR roles of funding conduits, cross-sector collaborators, and intermediary actors. Additionally, in LTR, they were taking on advocacy roles as well as were involved in more grassroots organizing in LTR. Due to the fact that they lived in a political context that afforded certain politicians free reign with little accountability, CBOs were also serving as government watchdogs. Finally, in order to play any of these roles well, CBOs had to conduct their own research and investigations. They researched best practices for their organizations, conducted community needs assessment for emerging needs in the LTR, and conducted program evaluations in order to assess their work and provide feedback to their funders. They also functioned as investigators, following state money and keeping updated on state recovery policies. These roles were overlapping and complex and CBOs sometimes struggled to fulfill these additional LTR roles without additional resources.

CBOs managed all of these roles and challenges by forming collaborations with other CBOs. In parallel with the disaster capitalist approach of the state government, who took advantage of the disaster context – what they termed a "blank slate" – to enact economic development projects that benefitted the wealthy, CBOs on the Gulf Coast used the disaster context as an opportunity to develop a tightly woven web of organizations and community advocates to coordinate service provision and to advocate for interests of the community in an unprecedented way for that area. Taking advantage of an "everybody knows everybody" community, CBOs were able to hold the government accountable to their small area, which turned out to be a full-time job.

In addition to forming collaborations with other CBOs and community members, CBOs who were most successful (i.e., were still operating, conducting services or advocacy, and had future plans for their organization) in LTR were those that were able to "diversify" their funds, were able to find a balance between sticking to their mission and remaining flexible, included both service provision and advocacy in their mission, and were involved in collaborations with other sectors including business and government sectors. CBOs who were primarily service organizations in 2007, mentioned adding an advocacy component to their mission in 2013, recognizing that having the funds and the space and the capacity is not enough to enact change if they don't have the power to do so. Ultimately, collaborations, increased (or added) advocacy, and learning to navigate a complex web of power dynamics has contributed to the success of CBOs on the Coast to influence recovery processes and to continue to thrive as organizations.

Levels	Challenges	CBO Effects	CBO Response
Historical Context	Perception of racism	Difficulty recruiting professionals and obtaining outside funding. Assumption of CBO racism.	Increased CBO collaborations in order to share resources.
	History of segregation	Discrimination in disaster effects and recovery processes.	Educating community members and government leaders on current needs.
Macro	Great Recession	Decrease in available public and private funds.	Worked to diversify funding; increased partnerships with CBOs.
	Plantation Economy	Gave "white wealthy landowner" group a monopoly on power, wealth, and decision-making (often along racial and class lines).	Took on more advocacy and government watchdog roles to increase voice in decision-making.
	Rise of Tea Party	Cuts in government spending on social services and increase in general public hostility toward social services.	Engaged in grassroots organizing to educate the community; continued working to forge cross-sector collaborations.
	Meritocracy/American Dream Ideology	Used to explain inequalities in disaster recovery; Kept $ from most needy by implying that needy people do not deserve help. Perpetuated values that privileged certain groups over others in recovery.	Engaged in grassroots organizing, community education, & needs assessment research to show the existing needs in the community. Continued in collaborating with other CBOs to coordinate services to vulnerable groups
	Insular culture	Led to distrust of outsiders and outsiders within/NIMBY-ism	Used PR and community education to address concerns toward "outsider" groups.
Exo	Government shutdown	Affected CBOs who received federal funds.	Worked to diversify funding; increased partnerships with CBOs.
	Conservative small government +Gov. Barbour's power	No accountability for recovery $ spending.	Took on a investigative and government watchdog role.
	Gov/Bus elite privileged	Economic development over community.	Increased CBO advocacy; formed cross-sector collaborations
	Biggert-Waters Insurance Act	Created uncertainty for homeowners, particularly low-income	Housing CBOs included education component in services
	Changes in administration	Must learn to navigate new power dynamics.	Took on a investigative and government watchdog role. Continued to forge cross-sector collaborations.
Meso	Lack of CBO voice in decision-making	CBOs unable to direct recovery in a way that benefitted community.	Increased cross-sector collaborations, grassroots organizing, and advocacy.
	Illusion of voice	Distracted CBOs and wasted their time and resources.	Took on more of an investigative researcher role and a government watchdog role.
	Business interests over community interests	Government worked to put more money in the hands of corporations instead of community members.	Continued to advocate for community members.
	Distrust of government	Difficult to work with government entities.	Community grassroots organizing to work to keep govt accountable and increase in cross-sector collaborations.
Micro	Lack of unified vision among CBOs in STR	Distrust and competition among CBOs; duplication of services.	CBO leaders worked together to share resources and coordinate services.
	Lack of grassroots leaders	Community members largely uneducated on recovery processes; no coordination.	Invested in developing grassroots leaders.
Individual	Illusion of Voice Staff cuts Frustration & Disillusionment with government	Staff stress & burnout	Invested in mental health services for staff; formed collaborations to share responsibilities and reduce burden on staff.

Table 11. CBO Response to Challenges by Ecological Systems Level

Chapter 8. Future Directions

Given findings that challenges at the state political and economic level were sustained throughout STR and LTR as well as the fact that the national political and economic context became even more relevant in LTR, I propose that future research further investigate the intersection of state and national politics with CBO participation in LTR. In particular, researchers should examine the ways in which ideology perpetuated at state and national levels has real-world impacts on CBO social service provision and advocacy efforts. For example, this study revealed that the rise of the Tea Party movement in state and national politics had financial and emotional impact on CBOs and CBO leaders; future research should examine the specific aspects of this movement and its ideologies that have had adverse effects on communities and CBOs. Quantifying these adverse effects at an individual and community level would help policy-makers fully understand the impact of national politics on the most vulnerable populations. Additionally, given the finding that CBOs utilized certain strategies, including increasing collaborations, advocacy, and cross-sector collaborations, to navigate this complex political environment, future disaster research might work to quantify these strategies in order to disseminate them to other CBOs struggling with similar challenges. Finally, disaster recovery researchers and practitioners should consider developing multi-level interventions that target these more macrosystem level challenges.

Dissemination of Findings

In addition to informing future research, the results from this study could be used to inform policy-makers and government entities that affect long-term recovery. Because most of the LTR challenges emerged from the state and national level, targeting federal

organizations involved in disaster policy or disaster funds allocation may be most fruitful. These findings could be disseminated in the form of a policy brief to government agencies involved in recovery policy and fund dissemination. For example, a policy brief disseminated to HUD could show the adverse effects of HUD's decision to waive federal stipulations on Community Development Block Grant funds granted to Mississippi. This brief could suggest that these stipulations not be waived in the future and, in fact, could argue for the addition of further restrictions based on this study's findings. For example, this study showed that CBOs spent a large amount of time and resources tracking government funds and protocols. Federal government entities might save CBOs time and resources by being transparent about policies and procedures related to recovery, making sure that these documents are easily accessible. Additionally, a policy brief might suggest that government entities relying on CBOs to conduct outreach and community education in LTR supply CBOs with the funds and resources to fulfill these roles. Ultimately, policy briefs would emphasize that accountability be built into the management of all recovery funds. No one politician should be able to direct billions of dollars without any oversight or stipulations. By showing the negative effects of one of HUD's policy decision on many vulnerable populations and CBOs may encourage organizations, like HUD, to include more restrictions that prevent the misuse of recovery funds (See Appendix A for an example of a policy brief).

Chapter 9. Limitations

Despite its potential to contribute to disaster literature, this study is limited in the fact that it is geographically and contextually bound. While uniqueness of context is also part of this study's advantage, it may limit generalizability to other locations and contexts. The fact that this area has experienced multiple types of disasters may increase the likelihood that findings could be generalizable to other disaster areas. Another possible limitation includes the bias toward more successful CBOs. Because defunct CBOs are harder to locate, most of the participating CBOs were more successful – still in operation, serving clients, and securing funding. Less successful organizations had less time to participate in the study or were no longer in operation. While I did include some struggling CBOs, the majority of CBOs were more successful organizations. Future research should specifically target those organizations that did not survive a disaster. Finally, this study was analyzed based on the thematic coding of one coder, meaning that other researchers might arrive at different conclusions using the same data and codes. However, when a research assistant coded an excerpt from the study using the same codebook, we achieved high agreement, suggesting that other researchers using these codes would yield similar coding results.

Chapter 10. Conclusion

This study is one of the first to study CBOs roles in LTR and therefore, has important implications for long-term disaster research. Conducted almost a decade after Hurricane Katrina, this study presented CBOs' roles, challenges, and successes in long-term disaster recovery. CBOs continued to have important impact in LTR by serving as cross-sector collaborators, funding conduits, intermediary actors, advocates, grassroots organizers, researchers, and government watchdogs despite the many challenges they faced at multiple systems levels. Ultimately, this study revealed that national and state political and economic factors influenced CBOs and the groups that they served more than any other factors related to disaster or disaster recovery. Therefore, if CBOs are to continue to function in their LTR roles, it will be imperative to understand how to address challenges at the macrosystems level. As federal, local, and state governments increasingly rely on CBOs during times of disaster, understanding how CBOs negotiate long-term recovery is imperative.

Appendices

Appendix A: HUD Brief

Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) in Long-term Disaster Recovery

BRIEF

Prepared for
The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
By Anna R. Smith
University of Hawai'i at Mānoa

CBOs Involvement in Recovery has increased.

CBOs contribute to long-term recovery by:

- Funneling funds to people "on the ground"
- Forging collaborations across government, private, and community sectors
- Holding local and state governments accountable to equitable recovery practices
- Researching community needs and government policies

CBOs have community trust and insider knowledge of community needs.

CASE STUDY: Mississippi CBOs & Katrina Recovery

Governor Barbour requested waivers from HUD on CDBG funds so as to distribute funds quickly with no red tape.

HUD granted request and Governor Barbour had free reign to allocate funds.

Majority of funds went to homeowners with insurance and economic development projects.

Vulnerable populations were neglected.

CBOs struggled to provide services for growing needs with less resources to do so.

The government gives money for programs to help needy people. And the state and local government takes it and uses it to feed the pockets of the rich.

CBO work is impeded by political and economic factors outside of their control. HUD can help.

A governor should not have full responsibility for the spending of the money…There needs to be oversight based on the needs that are there, and the communities need to be involved because [the federal government] basically gave Haley Barbour, they just waived everything

We Recommend:

- Keep stipulations in tact for federal aid monies.
- Do not allow for waivers in the name of expediency.
- Instill an oversight committee at the state and federal level for these monies.
- Require that recipients collaborate with CBOs in disaster area.

Appendix B: 2008 Interview Instrument

Mississippi Communities Recovery from Hurricane Katrina
Key Informant/Key Leader Interviews

I. COMMUNITY RESPONSE/RECOVERY ASSESSMENT

1. I'd like to begin by asking you where you were living and what was your work before Hurricane Katrina. Were your family and home affected by the Hurricane? How have you fared since?

2. How did you become involved in the response and recovery in Mississippi?

3. What have been your role and your organization's role in the recovery?

    - Whom have you worked with?

4. What does the notion of recovery for your community mean to you? Is it an appropriate term to describe what you are experiencing here in Mississippi?

5. How would you gauge the success of Mississippi's efforts thus far?
   PROBE:
    - ***Has the state accomplished what you had hoped by this time?***
    - ***Why or Why not?***

6. If you think about the coast in general how would you compare various community institutions, before Katrina and today?
   PROBE:
    - ***What is the housing situation?***
    - ***How are the schools?***
    - ***Health Care?***
    - ***Basic services (banking, gas stations, groceries, shopping)?***
    - ***Local government?***

7. What are some of the remaining biggest challenges facing _____ in terms of the quality of life of its people?
   PROBE:
    - ***Housing***
    - ***Health/Health Care***
    - ***Work/Employment***
    - ***Education***
    - ***What needs to be done?***

8. What is your overall assessment of how the process of recovering and rebuilding _____ after Katrina has been handled?

PROBE:

- ***By government (fed/state/local)***
- ***By business (large corporations centered outside the state vs. local; small vs. large)***
- ***By nonprofits (national – Red Cross, etc.; local _____)***
- ***By churches***
-

9. What would you say were the greatest successes in the process?
   PROBE:
   - ***What agencies, individuals or groups have been most helpful?***
   - ***What could have been done better?***

10. What have been the biggest obstacles to achieving a successful recovery and renewal?
    PROBE: How has it dealt with them?

11. Who is having the biggest say in how _____ gets rebuilt after the storm?
    PROBE:
    - ***Why is that?***
    - ***Are you pleased with that?***
    - ***How would you prefer it to be?***

12. How has the demographic makeup of the coast changed since the storm?
    PROBE: By that I mean,
    - ***The numbers of people living here?***
    - ***The racial/ethnic mix (White, African American, Asian, Hispanic)?***
    - ***Women and men?***
    - ***What about the age mix – the elderly, the young?***

13. Are there particular groups in _____ who are more vulnerable and who have had a more difficult time rebuilding their lives after the storm?
    PROBE:
    - ***What about racial/ethnic groups?***
    - ***Has it been harder on women or men?***
    - ***How about the poor or working class people?***

14. Could you describe what the challenges have been for those groups? Why do you think it has been so hard for them?

15. How do people of **different races, ethnicities, nationalities, classes, ages** get along in _____? Are there tensions? What do they revolve around?

    - Has the aftermath of the storm changed these relations?

II. COMMUNITY COMPARISONS

16. One of the things we are especially interested in is how the nature and pace of the recovery has varied across communities along the coast. Specifically, we're looking at East Biloxi, Ocean Springs, Moss Point, Pass Christian, Waveland, and Diamondhead.

    - Could you describe the differences in the ways that these communities have responded?
    - Which have been most successful? Which the least? Why do you say so?
    - Which have received most Federal and State support? Why?

17. Please describe for me your impression of the level of trust between people in _____ and: 1) Local Government 2) State Government 3) Federal Government 4) Social Service Institutions 5) Businesses 6) Financial Institutions?

III. CAMILLE COMPARISON

18. Were you living on the coast during Camille? What was your experience then?

19. How would you compare the Katrina and Camille experiences?
    PROBE:
    - ***Did the government responses differ?***
    - ***Recovery/rebuilding processes differ?***
    - ***People's responses differ?***

20. Do you think that Camille affected how people and agencies responded to Katrina?

IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS, OVERALL ASSESSMENT

21. Were you aware that MS had requested to use hurricane recovery dollars to expand the port in Gulfport? Do you Agree? What do you think about that plan?

22. A recent article in the New York Times indicated that the state is not using the bulk of Hurricane Katrina grants to help low income families even though congress stipulated such use. Were you aware of that?

    - Why did that happen?
    - How?
    - Thoughts?

23. Is the state doing enough to help low income home owners, renters, and other poor and working class populations?

    - What else should be done?

24. If another storm like Katrina were to arrive here next week, how do you think the process would be handled? The same? Differently?

25. Would you describe how you think the coast will look in 2 years? In 5 years? 10 years? Who will have to be involved to make it happen?

V. CLOSING

Thank you very much for your time. By sharing your story you will help us to better understand the disaster and to contribute to new strategies to make the transition and recovery easier for future survivors of disasters.

26. Is there anything else you would like to tell me about any of the issues we've discussed today?

27. Can you give me names of other key leaders who have been integrally involved in the recovery who might be willing to talk with us?

28. Lastly, all of the responses from the interviews will be grouped together for a summary report. Would you like to receive a copy of this summary report?

Could I call on you again later in our process?

Thank you so much for sharing your perspectives with us.

PRESENT PARTICIPANT WITH CASH ENVELOPE AND GET THEM TO SIGN RECEIPT

Appendix C: 2008 Informed Consent

Dear

I'm working with an interdisciplinary team of researchers at the University of South Carolina, including Drs. Susan Cutter, Jerry Mitchell, Mark Piergorsch, and Mark Smith, on a project to assess the recovery from Hurricane Katrina is proceeding along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The purpose of the project, funded by the National Science Foundation, is to assess differences in recovery experiences so that we can identify factors and processes that would enable communities to better prepare for and manage the response to and recovery from future disasters.

I would like to invite you to participate in the study to help us understand how your community fared during and after the storm. We are interested in your assessment of the assets, resources, challenges, and continuing needs that you and your community have, as well as how you assess the process of recovery/rebuilding in your community.

What is asked of you:
You will be asked to fill out a short form describing yourself (age, gender, work history, etc.), but you will not put your name on the form. Then you will take part in an interview of approximately one and one half hours, which will be tape recorded for later transcription so that our research can accurately understand and describe your responses.

Confidentiality: Your opinions and that of other community representatives will be summarized as a group. Your name will not be recorded on the audiotape. Your name and your responses will never be linked. Thus your responses will be kept confidential as allowed by law. Audiotapes will be kept in a locked cabinet, which only project staff will have access to. Transcriptions and all identifying information will be kept on password protected computers behind locked doors.

Your rights: Your deciding to take part in this project and answer the questions will not affect your current or future relationship with the University of South Carolina or any other organizations. Your answers are important, but you can choose not to answer any question and to withdraw at any time.

Potential risks or discomforts: Although there is a minor risk of breach of confidentiality, as described above, steps are being taken to ensure the confidentiality and security of your information. The questions we ask about your community will not be personal in nature.

Compensation: At the end of the interview, you will receive $25 in cash. If however, for whatever reasons you chose not to complete the interview or chose to withdraw early, you will not receive the gift card. You may also refuse the gift card if you so chose.

Voluntary Participation: Participation in this study is completely voluntary, and will affect your current of future relationship with the University of South Carolina or any other organizations. You may withdraw at any time, for any reason, with no negative consequences.

Potential benefits: This information will help us to better understand the perceptions of community leaders about the assets, challenges, and continuing needs of your community as you rebuild after the storm and plan for the future. Through a comparison of your community's experiences with those of other communities we hope to identify strategies and policies to aid communities in planning for and mitigating the effects of future disasters.

Thank you for your consideration.

With kind regards,

Dr. Lynn Weber, Professor
Women's Studies and Psychology
University of South Carolina
513 Barnwell College
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Office: (803) 777-5012
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Appendix D: 2013 Interview Instrument

CBOs and Long-Term Recovery on Mississippi Gulf Coast
Key Informant FOLLOW UP Interviews

[IF NECESSARY, INSERT ANY INTRO INFO RE: THE STUDY]
When we talked with you 5 years ago, you told us about your work with [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] and your involvement in the community recovery initiatives. Today, I'm interested in learning to find out what has happened over the past 5 years with your organization, with the community, and with you personally. I'm interested in the challenges, the changes, and the successes as well as where you are now. Let's start by talking about [NAME OF ORGANIZATION].

I. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

1. What ***CHANGES*** has [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] been through in the past 5 years?
   PROBES:
   Changes in:
   - ***Mission***
   - ***Capacity to serve your clients/constituents? In what ways?***
   - ***Financial Status/Funding picture? Improved? Worsened? How?***
   - ***Capacity to achieve its overall goals? How? Why?***

2. What have been the major ***CHALLENGES*** for [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] in the past five years?

3. What have been the major ***SUCCESSES*** for [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] in the past five years?
4. What is your ***OVERALL*** assessment of [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] ***TODAY?***
5. Could you describe the ways that [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] ***COLLABORATES with other GROUPS/ORGANIZATIONS?***
   PROBES:
   - ***Benefits of that work?***
   - ***Challenges?***

6. When we were here in 2007 and 2008, the Steps Coalition was a young organization facing challenges. Have you or [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] been involved with the ***Steps Coalition or other collaborative advocacy networks***?
   PROBES:
   - ***If so, in what ways?***
   - ***How would you assess __(Steps/ Other Organization)___ effectiveness? Successes? Challenges?***

7. What new organizations have emerged or arrived on the coast in the last five years?
   - ***What kind of impact are they having? (Positive? Negative?)***

8. How would you assess the overall strength or resilience of the Community Based Organizations (CBOs) on the coast today compared to before Katrina?
   PROBES:
   - ***Would you say that some groups/organizations are WORSE OFF? Which ones? Why?***
   - ***Would you say that some groups/organizations are BETTER OFF? Which ones? Why?***

II. RECOVERY PROCESSES

Now I'd like to talk with you about how you see recovery and recovery processes.

1. Some people have said there is no such thing as "recovery" from Katrina, but instead people construct a "new normal." Based on your personal and organizational experience, what is your interpretation of "recovery"?
   PROBES:
   - ***For your organization?***
   - ***For your community?***
   - ***For individuals?***

2. Five years ago, we asked you about the driving forces behind the recovery. What individuals or groups would you say are the driving forces shaping the livelihood of the communities on the coast today?
   PROBES:
   - ***Governor's Office/ State government***
   - ***Business Community***
   - ***Local Government***
   - ***Particular Individuals or Groups? (e.g., Gulf Coast Business Council, Renaissance Corporation)***
   - ***CBOs***

3. Thinking back over the last 8 years, which groups or individuals had *the biggest say* in how the recovery proceeded?

4. Do you feel that your organization and others like it had a say in how the recovery proceeded? **If so, how? If not, why not?**

5. Which groups and individuals benefitted most from recovery processes?

6. When we were here before, the Port of Gulfport expansion was a controversial issue. As the project has gone forward, how do you view the Port expansion today?
   PROBE:
   - ***How has it affected the local community? The economy?***
   - ***Has it produced the promised jobs for local residents?***

7. Compared to before Katrina, what is the availability of **AFFORDABLE HOUSING? PUBLIC HOUSING?**
   PROBES:
   - ***Is it meeting the needs of low income people?***

8. When we were here 5 years ago, some leaders talked about the **DYNAMICS AND DIFFERENTIALS OF POWER** between various groups of residents, community organizations, the governor and his council, and business interests. How do you describe them today?

III. COMMUNITY CHANGES

Now I'd like to address the ways that coastal communities have changed since Hurricane Katrina.

1. How has your community changed since Katrina? How is it different?
   PROBES:
   - ***The numbers of people living here?***
   - ***The racial/ethnic mix (White, African American, Vietnamese, Asian, Hispanic)?***
   - ***Women and men?***
   - ***What about the age mix – the elderly, the young?***
   - ***Social class—poor, working class, middle class, wealthy?***
   - ***What have been the MAIN DRIVERS of these changes?***
   - ***What EVENTS OR ISSUES HAVE GALVANIZED OR IMPEDED CHANGE over the past five years?***
     (BP, ISAAC, ETC……If they don't identify these other "events" no need to probe…..)

   INSTITUTIONS:
   - ***Housing?***
   - ***Health/Health Care?***
   - ***Work/Employment?***
   - ***Education?***

2. What are the **MAJOR CHALLENGES** your community faces today?
3. What **BENEFITS** has your community derived from the recovery after Katrina?

IV. DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

Now I'd like to hear about [NAME OF ORGANIZATION]'S preparedness for future disasters.

1. Looking to the future, how prepared would you say that [Name of Organization] is for another disaster on the coast?

- ***What is GREATEST NEED you would anticipate having in a future disaster?***

- ***What STEPS have you taken TO PREPARE?***

- ***Does your organization have DISASTER PLAN?***

- ***What are the CHALLENGES to DISASTER PREPARATION?***

2. How would you assess the overall disaster preparedness of CBOs on the coast?
   - ***What are their GREATEST NEEDS****?*
   - ***GREATEST STRENGTHS?***
   - ***GREATEST CHALLENGES?***
3. What are the lessons you and your colleagues at [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] have learned about how the coast's communities have been able to access the financial and human resources needed to recover?

4. What advice would you give to CBO's to thrive and to be prepared for future crises and disasters?

   PROBES:
   - ***Resource Management/Allocation***
   - ***Collaborations***

5. How do you see the future of the coast? How do you see it in 5 or 10 years?

   - For CBOs?
   - For Affordable Housing?

V. PERSONAL

1. When we interviewed community members 5 years ago, it was evident that for people who survived Katrina and were working in the recovery efforts, there was a considerable amount of stress and negative health impacts. In terms of your PERSONAL AND FAMILY HEALTH AND WELL-BEING, how have the last five years been for you and your family?

2. Have you and your family experienced any other major issues or challenges in the past year?

VI. WRAP UP

1. Is there anything else you would like to tell me about any of the issues we've discussed today?
2. Can you give me names of other leaders who have been integrally involved in disaster recovery who might be willing to talk with us?
3. Lastly, would you like a copy of any reports we produce from this research?

FILL OUT DEMOGRAPHIC INFO SHEET HERE

Could I call on you again later in our process?
Thank you so much for sharing your perspectives with us

GIVE $ RECEIPT FORM; $; AND RECEIPT

Appendix E: 2013 Informed Consent

Community-Based Organizations and Long-Term Recovery along the Mississippi Gulf Coast

Study Information
Our research team at the University of South Carolina is continuing a research project begun in 2007 to further understanding of the recovery process after Hurricane Katrina on the Mississippi gulf coast. In the five years since the initial interviews with people in community-based organizations engaged in those recovery initiatives, the area has experienced the BP oil spill, Hurricane Isaac, and the national housing crisis, among other challenges. The purpose of the current project, funded by the University of South Carolina Office of the Provost, is to revisit these community-based organizations, groups and individuals to better understand how these new challenges have affected the capacity and resilience of community-based organizations and the people who work in them.

Your participation in the study will help us understand how your community and organization has fared during and after these disasters. We are interested in your assessment of the assets, resources, challenges, successes, and continuing needs that you and your organization have and of whether the experiences in the aftermath of Katrina helped or hindered recovery from these more recent disasters.

What is asked of you
You will take part in an interview of approximately one and one-half hours, which will be audio recorded for later transcription so that we can accurately understand and describe your responses.

Confidentiality
Your opinions and those of other community representatives will be summarized as a group. Your name will not be recorded on the audiotape. Your name and your responses will never be linked. Thus your responses will be kept confidential as allowed by law. Audio files will be kept in a locked cabinet, which only project staff will have access to. Transcriptions and all identifying information will be kept on password protected computers behind locked doors.

Your rights
Your deciding to take part in this project and answer the questions will not affect your current or future relationship with the University of South Carolina or any other organizations. Your answers are important, but you can choose not to answer any question and to withdraw from the study at any time.

Potential risks or discomforts
Although there is a minor risk of breach of confidentiality, as described above, steps are being taken to ensure the confidentiality and security of your information. The questions we ask about your community will not be personal in nature.

Compensation
At the end of the interview, you will receive $30 in cash. However, if for whatever reason you choose not to complete the interview or choose to withdraw early, you will not receive the compensation. You may also refuse the money if you choose.

Voluntary Participation
Participation in this study is completely voluntary and will not affect your current or future relationship with the University of South Carolina or any other organizations. You may withdraw at any time, for any reason, with no negative consequences.

Potential Benefits
This information will help us to better understand the perceptions of community leaders about the assets, challenges, and continuing needs of your community as you rebuild after these disasters and plan for the future. Through a comparison of your community's experiences with those of other communities, we hope to identify strategies and policies to aid communities in planning for and mitigating the effects of future disasters.

Contact Persons
For more information concerning this research, please contact Lynn Weber at weberl@mailbox.sc.edu or at the phone numbers below. If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact: Thomas Coggins, Director, Office of Research Compliance, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208 at 777-7095 or tcoggins@mailbox.sc.edu.

Thank you for your consideration.

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Appendix F: Codebook

Name	Description
Across Levels	Includes themes that affect multiple levels simultaneously. Different from "Multiple "Levels" which refers to themes that can affect (or exist at) different levels depending on the quote.
Coast Visibility	Includes quotes that refer to outsiders' perceptions of the Coast.
Feelings Attitudes	Codes dealing with emotions or affect or beliefs toward someone/thing
Attitude toward Casinos	Re: casinos on the Coast
Attitude toward Govt	Could be local, state, or national government.
Feeling Devalued Disregarded	Refers to quotes about feeling disregarded or devalued by government, other people, other communities, the country, etc.
Feeling Disillusioned	Feelings of being disillusioned with the progress of recovery.
Feeling Dispirited	Refers to feelings of depression, being "down" or dispirited. "Dispirited" is the word used by one of the interviewees.
Feelings of Empathy	Underdeveloped code that refers to increased empathy for others experiencing disaster
Shock	Refers to experiences of shock (and not just shocking events themeselves). Could include symptoms of shock even if shock is not explicitly mentioned.
Trauma	Refers to experiences of trauma and symptoms of trauma. Trauma could be ongoing in the present or could be referring to past traumas.
CBO Level	This level includes CBO roles, operation, and impacts within the community and across multiple other levels.
CBO Challenges	Challenges that CBOs face in their operations, service provision, or recovery. Can be related to recover, disaster, or otherwise.
CBO Division	Division and competition among CBOs on the Coast.
Simultaneous Org Recovery	Refers to difficulties experienced when CBOs in disaster zones are trying to recover themselves while still providing services to those in need.
Simultaneous Personal Recovery	Refers to difficulty for CBO staff to continue working while undergoing recovery personally as well.
Slow Recovery	Refers broadly to the ways in which the slow progress in recovery in the community is affecting CBOs as well as the ways in which CBO recovery itself has been slow.
CBO Collaborations	Broadly captures ways in which CBOs collaborate with other CBOs as well as some of the experiences of those collaborations.
Female Collaborations	Refers to collaborations that were female-led.
CBO Operation	Refers to functions of the CBO at an administrative, operational level
Capacity	Considers the ability of CBOs to continue its operations (therefore, may overlap with other operations).
Changes	Refers to changes in CBO operations as a result of disaster or the recovery process.
Funding	Refers to CBO's funding resources and strategies.

Mission	Refers to CBO mission - especially as it relates to disaster and recovery.
New Roles	New staff roles which have emerged because of disaster and recovery.
Staff	Quotes that refer to staff challenges or successes
Working Furiously	Refers to quotes that describe the burnout and constant work of CBO leaders in the immediate aftermath
CBO Roles in Recovery	The different roles that CBOs are playing in recovery (LT and ST). Does not refer to immediate disaster response.
Community Gov Liaisons	Working as advocates who transmit concerns from the community up to government officials and working to transmit policy from government to the community.
Cross Sector Collaborators	Collaborating across business, government, and community sectors to create policy or to influence recovery.
Funding Conduits	Managing and dispersing funds from government or private foundations to the community or other CBOs
Info Dissemination	Disseminating information to communities, government officials, or even national agencies. Different from community-government liaisons in that this information is more educational.
Reaching Vulnerable Pops	Refers to CBOs reaching hard-to-reach populations with information and services.
Researchers	Conducting needs assessments, researching best practices, and researching government policy and funds.
CBO Roles in Response	How CBOs worked in the immediate response period
CBO Strengths	Refers to qualities or actions of CBOs that have been beneficial to communites and CBOs operations
CBO Successes	Refers to particular successes that CBOs have had
Disaster Benefits	Ways in which disaster has brought about benefits to CBOs
Influx of Money	Disasters brought in more funding opportunities for local CBOs
New Programs	Disaster brought about new programs that actually addresses pre-existing problems exacerbated by disaster
Disaster Prep	Steps taken by CBOs to prepare for disasters and to help the community prepare for disasters
New CBOs	Refers to quotes about CBOs that emerged after disasters
Service Provision	Refers to CBOs services that they provide to the community.
Disruption in Services Operations	Disruption in services provided to community due to disaster or recovery.
Context	Refers to environmental context that affects CBOs
Geographical Physical Context	Ways in which the physical landscape of the coast (either natural or manmade) that impacts CBOs and communities
Historical Context	Certain historical events or states that impact the present
Political Economic Climate	Political or economic environment that impacts CBOs on the coast
Local	Refers to explanations of local, community economic and political context.
National	Refers to US politics and economic context.
NO Comparison	Compares the political and economic climates of the Coast and New Orleans

State	Refers to state politics and economics.
Events	Certain moments that occur – may have lasting effects and overlap with context
BP Oil Spill	Effects, events, recovery that occurred because of the oil spill in 2010
Immediate Response	Period immediately following disaster. Categorized by lack infrastructure, etc.
Multiple Disasters	Any point where interviewee speaks of multiple disasters as an event. Could overlap with context
Recession	Refers to events and effects of the Great Recession and housing crisis in 2008
Exo Level	
Cross Sector Coordination	Descriptions of CBOs collaborating with business, govt sectors.
Development over Community	Descriptions of government privileging business interests over community
Government Response	Descriptions of government's response to recovery
No Follow thru	Interviewees discuss no action in recovery
Progress	Refers to progress of recovery on Coast
Priorities	Govt prioritizing homeowners with insurance; overlap with development
Healthcare	Descriptions of state of or changes in institution of healthcare
Mental Healthcare	Descriptions of state of or changes in institution of mental healthcare
Policy Inconsistencies	Gov't policies on recovery are inconsistent and opaque.
Port	Port as microcosm of government priorities and power
Individual Level	
Macro Level	
Classism	Inequalities based on class
Disaster Capitalism	Using disaster as an opportunity to redevelop Coast in a way that privileges business elites and corporations. Ways to make money from disaster.
Ideology	When stories work to obscure power and inequalities. Think meritocracy, etc.
Racism	Inequalities based on race or different "types" of people
Sexism	Inequalities based on perceived gender
Meso Level	
Community Challenges	Coastal community challenges
Continued Community Challenges	For 2013 only. Challenges that have continued from STR into LTR
Emerging Community Challenges	Any challenges that are emerging because of the recovery process
Decline of Community	Decline of certain communities in terms of population loss, closed schools, lack of grocery stores, no infrastructure, etc.
Insurance Costs	Rising costs of insurance premiums to stay on coast.
Turkey Creek	Environmental injustice of development projects in AA community
Erasure	Communities feeling as though their communities, history, and struggles have been erased.
Exacerbated Community Challenges	Pre-Katrina challenges that have been exacerbated because of the storm and/or the recovery process
Childcare	Affordable childcare
Domestic Violence	Violence between co-habiting or intimate partners.
Food Deserts	Lack of access to healthy food
Living Wage	Wages not high enough to support the cost of living
Community Changes	Positive or negative and for any reason

Community Successes	Events, attitudes, structures, etc. that the community takes pride in.
Emerging Community Successes	Perhaps not realized yet, but perceived successes that are in the works.
Grassroots Community Action	Community members coming together to educate each other and advocate
Advocacy	Fighting for community interests at policy-level
Education Consciousness Raising	Learning about power dynamics and ones place in those dynamics as well as learning about the policies in effect
Long Term Recovery Prediction	Interviews discuss how they see the coast in the future
Long Term Recovery Realization	For 2013 only, ways in which 2007 prediction was correct
Long Term Recovery Vision	Positive – how they would like to see the coast in the future
Regional Vision Coordination	Unification of coastal counties in directing recovery for their area (CBO & govt)
Micro Level	
Schools	Effects of recovery or disaster playing out in schools
Multiple Level	Themes under this heading can exist at multiple levels and can refer to multiple levels depending on the quote.
Health	Can refer to community or individual health affected by recovery or disaster
Mental Health	Refers to community or individual mental health affected by LTR or disaster
Recovery Meaning	"What does recovery mean to you?"
Recovery Progress	Assessment of where the Coast is in the process of recovery
Support	CBO/person/community social, financial, spiritual supports
External Support	Could be financial or volunteers, etc.
Faith	Could be a faith group or one's actual beliefs
Government Support	Could be in form of money of perceived attitude
Social Support	Friends, networks, families
Volunteers	Help of volunteers in recovery
Uneven Recovery	Discusses inequality in recovery process
Unmet Needs	Glaring needs related to disaster and recovery
Affordable Housing	Could refer to Section 8, housing stock, etc.
E Biloxi	Lack of recovery in E. Biloxi and why
Renters	Assistance for renters affected by disaster
Rent Increase	Increase in rents because of increased insurance rates, development, etc.
Voice	Having a say in the way recovery proceeds
Illusion of Voice	Govt inviting public input but not listening
Women in Recovery	Women as the movers and the shakers on the ground in recovery
Power	Access to resources, wealth, social capital, decision-making.
Knowing the system	Understanding and navigating power dynamics
Spin	Similar to ideology. The stories told to explain the process. Media, politicians…
Confusion	Tactic to obscure allocating of funds to business by deliberately confusing process
Women Gaining Power	Women learning to navigate this system.

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